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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“[O]ne man’s pluralism is another man’s incoherence.”1 
 
Medicaid fosters constant tension between the federal govern-
ment and the states, and that friction has been exacerbated by its ex-
pansion in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(“PPACA”).2  Medicaid was passed as the caboose to Medicare’s train 
in 1965,3 and both federal programs protect needy populations that 
would be otherwise uninsured, yet Medicaid has always been treated 
quite differently from Medicare.  Medicaid was an under-theorized 
and underfunded continuation of existing programs that retained 
two key aspects of welfare medicine as it developed:  bias toward limit-
ing government assistance to the “deserving poor,” and delivery of 
care through the states that resulted in a strong sense of states’ 
rights.4  These ideas regarding the deserving poor and federalism 
have remained constants in the program over the last forty-six years. 
PPACA begins to change one of the two historic themes by ex-
panding eligibility for Medicaid beyond the deserving poor—for the 
first time in Medicaid’s history—combined with almost total federal 
funding for the new enrollees,5 but it is not a complete federal cap-
ture of the Medicaid program.  This major philosophical shift is a 
 
 1 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAID AND 
RELATED PROGRAMS 3 (1970). 
 2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1 (2010).  
The Obama administration has been calling the law the Affordable Care Act, but that 
nickname seems inadequate compared to the scope of the law. 
 3 Medicare and Medicaid are both amendments to the Social Security Act (“SSA”), so they 
are sometimes referred to as Title 18 and Title 19, which are their respective sections in 
the SSA.  THEODORE R. MARMOR WITH JAN S. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 1, 68, 
79 (1973). 
 4 ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA:  A CASE STUDY OF 
MEDICAID 51 (1974); see also David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution:  Democratic Experi-
mentalism and the Failure of AntiPoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 567 (2008) (noting that 
the United States has addressed poverty problems by decentralized, local policy whereas 
the prevailing approach in other developed countries has been centralized). 
 5 See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001. 
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step toward federalizing Medicaid, but it has gone largely unnoticed.  
While many governors claim that states need more control, they are 
protesting the economic aspect of the Medicaid expansion, not this 
philosophical about-face.6 
As a recent empirical study has shown,7 Medicaid is undeniably 
important in terms of providing a patient safety net, supplying fund-
ing for the states, and generally supporting the healthcare system,8 
but states fight its strictures by arguing their decision-making is com-
pelled from a monetary and a policy perspective.9  Predictably, some 
states have not responded enthusiastically to PPACA’s expansion of 
Medicaid.  In a lawsuit filed the same day PPACA was signed, approx-
imately twenty-six states have followed the lead of Florida’s Attorney 
General in challenging the constitutionality of PPACA.10  The states 
 
 6 See Sarah Barr, Governors Tell Panel Flexibility Essential; GOP Pushes for More Dramatic 
Changes, 19 BUREAU OF NAT’L AFF. HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT 346 (Mar. 7, 2011), 
available at http://www.bna.com/governors-tell-panel-n8589934695/ (reporting on Re-
publican governors’ demands before the House Energy and Commerce Committee to 
convert Medicaid to a block grant program to give states total flexibility); Robert Pear, 
Governors Fear Federal Cuts May Hobble Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/us/politics/27governors.html (reporting on Re-
publican governors’ desire for more flexibility in Medicaid and other cooperative federal-
ism programs, including Governor Barbour’s block grant proposal). 
 7 Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment:  Evidence from the First Year, 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17190, 2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17190 (describing Oregon’s experience with placing low-
income adults into a lottery to enroll in the Medicaid program, with the result that those 
selected by the lottery have had substantially higher healthcare utilization, lower out-of-
pocket medical expenditures, less medical debt, and notably better self-reported health). 
 8 Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty:  Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit Reduc-
tion Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 6 (2006) (describing Medicaid as an “essential 
part of the U.S. health care landscape”). 
 9 James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Care Reform Through Medicaid Managed Care:  
Tennessee (TennCare) as a Case Study and a Paradigm, 53 VAND. L. REV. 125, 133 (2000) (de-
scribing cooperative federalism programs such as Medicaid as having a “political lock-in” 
effect because the states lose much more money than they save when programmatic cuts 
occur).  See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program:  A 
Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 901 (1990) (describing the problems the 
states complained of during major Medicaid modifications in the 1980s).  A number of 
states have sued over healthcare reform, and Texas has claimed it is considering with-
drawing from the Medicaid program.  See Emily Ramshaw, Lawmakers Consider Medicaid 
Withdrawal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/us/politics/
07ttmedicaid.html (stating that Texas lawmakers proposed dropping out of the federal 
Medicaid program as a solution to the state’s budget shortfall). 
 10 See Complaint at 4, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91 (N.D. 
Fla. Mar. 23, 2010) (alleging that the Act exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers and vi-
olates the Tenth Amendment); see also Kevin Sack, Florida Suit Poses a Challenge to Health 
Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2010, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05
/11/health/policy/11lawsuit.html (describing the lawsuit filed by Republican Attorneys 
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have claimed, among other things, that certain aspects of PPACA vi-
olate principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment, and that 
the Medicaid expansion is “an unprecedented encroachment” on the 
sovereignty of states.11  They claim to be coerced into continuing to 
participate in Medicaid,12 yet the states have asked for more and more 
federal funding while expecting no concurrent increase in federal 
rules or oversight.13 
Continuing as a federal-state partnership has few currently recog-
nizable benefits, but almost no one has performed a federalism-based 
policy analysis of the Medicaid program.  Instead, as the PPACA liti-
gation illustrates, the program is fixed in the collective consciousness 
as a classic example of cooperative federalism,14 but the program’s 
design is creating more discord than cooperation.15  Medicaid’s struc-
 
General from Florida and approximately nineteen other states challenging the individual 
mandate and other aspects of PPACA). 
 11 Complaint, Florida v. United States, supra note 10, at 4. 
 12 Id. at 9–10.  Judge Vinson rejected the coercion argument put forth by Florida and twen-
ty-five other states.  See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 
3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (declaring the minimum 
coverage provision unconstitutional). 
 13 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Governors Get Advice for Saving on Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/us/politics/04medicaid.html (stating that “Gov-
ernors said . . . they wanted waivers of some federal requirements and relief from Con-
gress” in response to the economic recession and the increased Medicaid enrollment that 
accompanied it). 
 14 Cooperative federalism generally means the state and the federal government work to-
gether toward a common goal that has been set forth, structured, and funded by the fed-
eral government; Medicaid is often held up as a successful example of this form of fede-
ralism.  See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (describing Medicaid as a 
“cooperative endeavor” and the role of federal and state governments within that cooper-
ative federalism structure); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle:  The Spending 
Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 419 n.30 (2008).  
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”) are essentially the 
same from a federalism and practical perspective, so this Article will discuss Medicaid in-
tending that CHIP be folded into that conversation.  See Alan Weil et. al., Improving the 
Federal System of Health Care Coverage, in FEDERALISM AND HEALTH POLICY 399, 400 (John 
Holahan, Alan Weil & Joshua M. Wiener eds., 2003) (“Enacted 32 years later, the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) reflects the identical tension built into 
Medicaid.”). 
 15 Bruce C. Vladeck, former administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration 
under President Clinton, has stated: 
The current federal-state relationship doesn’t serve anyone’s interest particularly 
well.  It’s become nasty, and it hasn’t produced good government or good health 
care. . . . [T]here’s something to be said for some kind of swap and, while it’s 
complicated, I think we ought to start talking about it again.  I believe the way to 
fix long-term care is to give it to the states, but with an increased financial com-
mitment from the federal government.  When we better understand what the 
long-term care system should look like, we can shift it to the states.  Then the case 
for federalizing Medicaid for (nonelderly, nondisabled) children and adults is 
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ture is an outgrowth of very old assumptions about the role that local-
ities play in providing welfare-type programs.  But a federalism policy 
analysis shows us that this is the wrong path for a variety of reasons. 
This Article is one of only a small number of proposals over the 
past forty-six years for federalizing Medicaid.16  None of these propos-
als has grappled directly with the reasons that Medicaid does not sa-
tisfy federalism goals, and thus a key reason for modernizing Medica-
id’s structure has been ignored.  Despite being an area of “traditional 
state concern,”17 healthcare should no longer be left to the economic 
and political whims of the states, as Medicaid is not an effective Bran-
deisian “laboratory of the states.”18  Admittedly, some would oppose 
centralization on the ideological grounds that more federal govern-
ment power is bad, and more state or local power is good.  But Medi-
caid was built on a feeble foundation that allowed a patchwork pro-
gram to continue and has been solicitous of state control over welfare 
programs ever since—not a strong argument for the significant med-
ical variations and administrative costs that occur as a result of Medi-
caid’s divided structure.19 
This Article first will discuss the history and historical structure of 
Medicaid and its cooperative federalism approach.  This section will 
focus on two persistent themes of states’ rights and limiting benefits 
to the deserving poor in the creation of Medicaid and will demon-
strate how PPACA has begun the federalization process.  The Article 
will next consider the modern Supreme Court’s interpretation of fe-
 
stronger, because the federal government knows how to provide an acute care 
benefit. 
  Michael Birnbaum, The Landscape in 2009:  A Conversation with Bruce C. Vladeck, 34 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 401, 411 (2009). 
 16 As Professors Rubin and Feeley have noted, calling the United States’ central government 
the “federal” government is a bit of a misnomer.  See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD 
RUBIN, FEDERALISM:  POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 12–14 (2008) (assert-
ing that the United States’ central government is “confusingly known as the federal gov-
ernment,” even though “federal” means divided sovereignty).  Nevertheless, that is com-
mon parlance, and so this Article will refer to “federalizing” Medicaid meaning that 
Medicaid should be centralized within the national government. 
 17 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that 
if federal government takes over the regulation of areas that are “traditional state con-
cerns” and have nothing to do with commercial activities, the boundaries between federal 
and state authority would be blurred). 
 18 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 19 John Holahan et al., Federalism and Health Policy:  An Overview, in FEDERALISM AND HEALTH 
POLICY, supra note 14, at 1–2 (describing Medicaid as suffering from “considerable ineq-
uity across states”). 
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deralism to understand the current meaning of federalism as it may 
be implemented by the Roberts Court.  Though the Medicaid expan-
sion is, at least in terms of pages written, a small part of the chal-
lenges to PPACA, the litigation provides a vehicle for thinking 
through the real meaning of cooperative federalism versus dual sove-
reignty as explicated by the Court.  The final section of the Article 
will suggest that medicine generally and Medicaid specifically are al-
ready on the path to nationalization and will explore the conclusion 
that Medicaid should be nationalized because federalism ideals are 
generally not served by the current structure.  Indeed, as this Article 
goes to press, the Court has granted certiorari on the Medicaid ex-
pansion issues presented in Florida v. HHS. 
II.  MEDICAID, THE POOR, AND THE FEDERAL-STATE “PARTNERSHIP” 
Medicaid was created at the same time as Medicare yet is widely 
acknowledged to have involved significantly less philosophical or po-
litical thought than the Medicare program, which in turn pales in 
comparison to its European counterparts.20  The long history, which 
has been told well elsewhere, will be focused here to help describe 
the path dependence of Medicaid’s cooperative federalism struc-
ture.21 
 
A.  Two Themes:  Deserving Poor and States’ Rights 
Medicare, American universal health insurance for senior citizens, 
grew out of a push in Western Europe at the turn of the twentieth 
 
 20 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 53 (explaining that the Medicaid legislation had little 
commitment to any social philosophy, was politically and ideologically polarized, and 
even Medicare’s goals were different from the humanitarian goals of Western European 
programs); see also THOMAS W. GRANNEMANN & MARK V. PAULY, CONTROLLING MEDICAID 
COSTS:  FEDERALISM, COMPETITION, AND CHOICE 5 (1983) (describing Medicaid as an “af-
terthought” to Medicare). 
 21 For the plenary version of this history, see, e.g., TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, 
DISENTITLEMENT?  THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-
BASED RESPONSE 71 (2003) (describing that the first modern American insurance en-
titlement program started with the Civil War pension program, which has its roots in late-
eighteenth and early nineteenth century insurance programs in Europe); MARMOR & 
MARMOR, supra note 3 (providing an account of the political evolution of Medicare); 
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982) (recounting a 
comprehensive history of American healthcare); STEVENS & STEVENS supra note 4, at 5–56 
(providing an account for the philosophies and public and political concerns surround-
ing the Medicaid program). 
Dec. 2011] FEDERALIZING MEDICAID 437 
 
century to support industrial workers through social insurance, which 
included sickness benefits as a mechanism to prevent wage loss.22  So-
cial insurance was driven by the philosophical ideal of solidarity, and 
it was based in traditional liberal principles of entitlement to civil and 
political rights.23  The social insurance movement was not just about 
solidarity, it also furthered the economic realities that a healthier 
population is a more productive population and that all poor citizens 
could better contribute to a capitalist society if given the opportunity 
through government-sponsored insurance.  For example, the Ger-
man health insurance program was known to be both “humanistic” 
and “economic” because “the sooner he was cured, the sooner the 
employee was back at work.”24  The success of social insurance in Eu-
rope, though it occurred in various countries for differing reasons, 
provided fodder for an analogous movement in the United States. 
In the United States, the labor movement initially championed 
social insurance, and later it was promoted by President Theodore 
Roosevelt, who believed that “no country could be strong whose 
people were sick and poor.”25  Nevertheless, the idea of social insur-
ance, let alone medical insurance, was foreign to the United States 
and was not to become popular until the Great Depression, which 
gave President Franklin Delano Roosevelt a disaster platform from 
 
 22 See STARR, supra note 21, at 239–40 (describing the influence that industrial workers had 
on early social insurance programs in England and Germany, which Americans later fol-
lowed); see also JOST, supra note 21, at 71 (“Medicare and our other modern social insur-
ance programs . . . find their roots to [sic] social insurance programs that emerged in 
late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe.”). 
 23 See STARR, supra note 21, at 238–39 (describing that the advent of social insurance in the 
nineteenth century in Western Europe signaled not so much paternalistic protection 
from the state as provision of rights to healthcare benefits for workers). 
 24 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 8–9 (noting a similar rationale in England). 
 25 STARR, supra note 21, at 243; see also MARMOR & MARMOR, supra note 3, at 7 (explaining 
that the impetus in the early efforts for American government insurance programs came 
from the American Association for Labor Legislation).  The American Association for 
Labor Legislation had proposed government health insurance in the early 1900s, but the 
American Medical Association, as well as the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 
combated that movement, especially after learning that local physicians were opposed to 
any form of health insurance, let alone government sponsored health insurance.  Id.; see 
also JOST, supra note 21, at 73 (illustrating that the successful movements for national in-
surance programs in the 1910s were lead by the American Association for Labor Legisla-
tion); STARR, supra note 21, at 248 (describing that despite initial cooperation with the 
American Association for Labor Legislation’s push for insurance, the American Medical 
Association did not garner support from its membership).  Physicians were not able to 
block the advent of health insurance for long, as Blue Cross was created for hospitals and 
Blue Shield for physicians by the end of the Second World War.  Id. at 295–310.  Blue 
Cross was created by the American Hospital Association and Blue Shield was created by 
local medical societies so that healthcare providers controlled the health insurance rather 
than the other way around.  Id. at 306–10. 
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which to support government-sponsored insurance.  His efforts re-
sulted in the successful passage of the Social Security Act but in fail-
ure to pass proposals for universal health insurance.26  In fact, univer-
sal, government-sponsored health insurance was promoted consis-
consistently until the Johnson administration enacted Medicare and 
Medicaid.27 
Given its philosophical roots, and that almost every president 
from Roosevelt to Johnson had promoted universal health insurance 
for all citizens, Medicare was a compromise because it only provided 
insurance for the elderly.  Its foundation was solid, however, and the 
polity supported the notion that everyone would someday be old; 
thus we could and should insure the entire population against the 
vagaries of medical expenses that had impoverished many elderly and 
their families.  Because all citizens contribute federal payroll taxes in-
to Medicare, the public feels a sense of stewardship about the pro-
gram and a sense of security that this insurance will exist when age 
sixty-five arrives.28  Medicare is not only philosophically and financial-
ly more sound than Medicaid, but also, it has always been a federal 
program with centralized funding, rules, and administration.29 
In contrast to Medicare, Medicaid was built upon a set of preexist-
ing biases and assumptions, and its historical foundation contains two 
threads that carry forward to the modern program:  notions regard-
ing who constitutes the “deserving poor” and obeisance to states’ 
 
 26 MARMOR & MARMOR, supra note 3, at 8–9 (explaining that the vigor that proponents had 
for the passage of the Social Security Act marginalized the support for universal health 
insurance, which became “[a]n orphan of the New Deal”). 
 27 STARR, supra note 21, at 257–369; MARMOR & MARMOR, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that 
universal insurance was fought over by many groups through the Roosevelt, Truman, Ei-
senhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations). 
 28 STARR, supra note 21, at 368 (noting that the “contributory nature” of social security 
made Medicare feel familiar and more popular from the outset).  Some would point out 
that Medicare is not described as financially sound these days, though increasing costs are 
not the same as fiscal jeopardy.  See Jackie Calms, Obama’s Budget Focuses on Path to Rein in 
Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/us/politics/
15obama.html (describing the perceived increasing costs of Medicare and Medicaid in re-
lation to the President’s proposed budget).  It is interesting to note that one great contri-
butor to the question of Medicare “solvency” is that life expectancy in 1965 was 70 years, 
compared to 78 years today.  Thus, the program had an average lifespan of five years for 
beneficiaries at its inception but now has a lifespan closer to fifteen years for many bene-
ficiaries.  MARMOR & MARMOR, supra note 3, at 5–6 (“The demand for medical care has 
increased both through improved capacity and heightened expectations among longer-
living populations.”). 
 29 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006) (regional contractors assist in administration). 
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rights.30  Each of these threads has been remarkably tenacious and re-
veals the path-dependent nature of the Medicaid program.31 
Certain categories of blameless or “deserving” poor have been as-
sisted by local, state, or federal government since the turn of the 
twentieth century and consistently have included women (widows) 
and their children, the blind, the disabled, and impoverished elder-
ly.32  To understand the categories of deserving poor, it helps to iden-
tify where American welfare policies began.  Starting in the colonial 
period, states provided various forms of welfare assistance to so-called 
deserving poor based upon that particular state’s colonial policy as 
adopted from Elizabethan Poor Laws.33  Historically, poverty assis-
tance had been provided in localities or parishes in European coun-
tries as well, though that methodology changed drastically with the 
advent of social insurance at the turn of the twentieth century.34  In 
the United States, however, local responsibility for the poor remained 
 
 30 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 6, 8 (noting a “strong commitment, both in Congress 
and in the states, to states’ rights in the provision of public assistance”). 
 31 “Path dependence” is a way to describe the idea that not only does history matter, but it 
may prescribe a set of rules regarding a particular choice that make the choice much less 
deliberate than it might have been without the initial set of decisions creating the item at 
issue.  The idea is often traced to Professor Paul David’s 1985 essay describing path de-
pendence through the now-classic example of the continued use of the inefficient 
QWERTY keyboard.  Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 
332 (1985).  Professor David wrote:  “A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is 
one of which important influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by tempo-
rally remote events, including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than sys-
temic forces.”  Id. at 332.  Path dependence has been translated from mathematics and 
economics into political science and law and roughly correlates to the reliance on 
precedent on which our common law system depends.  See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank 
B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory:  Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1166, 1169–70 (2005) (describing how use of precedent is consi-
dered inherently path-dependent).  In this context, I use path dependence to indicate 
the aspect of this theory that conveys that “past decisions will significantly influence fu-
ture decisions” in such a way that prior decisions may not ever be revisited.  See id. at 1171 
(defining this version of path dependence as “sequencing path dependence” because the 
“order in which alternatives are considered can determine the outcomes of those choic-
es”). 
 32 JOST, supra note 21, at 80 (listing the beneficiaries of federal/state public assistance pro-
grams); STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 6–7 (identifying traditional groups that were 
the target of special assistance programs during the early twentieth century). 
 33 See JOST, supra note 21, at 67–68 (describing the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1597 to 1601); 
STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 5–6 (stating that general assistance to paupers during 
the Colonial era had roots in the Elizabethan Poor Laws); Sidney D. Watson, From Alm-
shouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care:  Lessons from Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 937, 940 (2010) (noting that public welfare was rooted in the English Poor Laws). 
 34 STARR, supra note 21, at 238–39 (describing social insurance as a new form of destitution 
management in the newly industrialized and capitalistic societies of Germany, England, 
and France). 
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entrenched, despite the centralization of welfare and other social pol-
icy during the Great Depression.  The colonies and then the states 
viewed poverty as something to be discouraged, and welfare laws re-
flected this attitude.35  The advent of poorhouses, which were suspi-
ciously similar to prisons (and yet also the precursor to hospitals), re-
flected hostility toward the non-working poor, who were called 
“paupers.”36  The prevailing belief was that working poor deserved as-
sistance, and those who engaged in pauperism did not.37 
The decentralized condition of American government during the 
early part of its history fragmented the approach to welfare assistance 
and facilitated the early differences between welfare, meaning charit-
able aid to the poor, and social insurance, meaning universal worker 
benefits.  States and localities were responsible for wide swaths of so-
cial policy, and no one challenged their approach to public assis-
tance, which was punitive in nature.38  Few attempted to address pub-
lic health through the power of the central, federal government prior 
to FDR’s New Deal, and any attempts were rejected as constitutionally 
untenable.39 
In historical and constitutional context, it is not surprising that 
states continued to dominate welfare policy; it was part of traditional 
state powers, and the country arguably was not centralized until indu-
strialization and urbanization occurred at the turn of the twentieth 
 
 35 JOST, supra note 21, at 68 (describing the general attitude toward public assistance as 
“conditions of the poor should be kept so miserable that no one would prefer relief to 
work”). 
 36 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 5 (explaining that the colonial attitude toward 
pauperism was that it was a form of “social disease and degeneracy”).  Poorhouses were 
the precursors to hospitals and their charitable orientation, as hospitals at their origin 
were places where the sick poor went to die.  The wealthy were attended by physicians at 
home.  See STARR, supra note 21, at 151 (“Early hospitals were considered, at best, unhap-
py necessities.”).  Attitudes about the poor have often reflected racism, anti-immigrant at-
titudes, religious discrimination, and a general desire to force those deemed “able bo-
died” to work.  See JOST, supra note 21, at 66–67, 173 (explaining that those hostile to the 
poor believe no one has an excuse to be poor when the United States has such abundant 
resources). 
 37 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 11 (describing the clear division between contri-
buting work-related social insurance to workers and giving to the “poor”). 
 38 See JOST, supra note 21, at 68–69 (describing if a pension recipient misspent or wasted 
benefits, the state director could take the benefit away, for which the beneficiary had no 
legal recourse). 
 39 See id. at 74 (quoting President Franklin Pierce saying, “I cannot find any authority in the 
Constitution for making the Federal Government the great almoner of public charity 
throughout the United States”).  Professor Jost provides the example of Dorothea Dix’s 
attempt to help states establish hospitals for the mentally ill through federal funding, leg-
islation that passed Congress but that President Franklin Pierce vetoed for perceived lack 
of federal power.  Id. at 73–74. 
Dec. 2011] FEDERALIZING MEDICAID 441 
 
century.  Industrialization facilitated societal changes that included 
expanded travel, broader and stronger national markets for commod-
ities, and a greater need for medical treatment for work-related inju-
ries.40  These factors, in combination with events such as the World 
Wars and world-wide depressions, created a need for laws to be res-
ponsive to national problems rather than a patchwork of local meas-
ures.  Thus, the New Deal brought important change at the federal 
level from a legislative and a constitutional interpretation perspective 
as well as from a public problem-solving perspective.41 
Although it did not produce national health insurance, the Social 
Security Act of 1935 (“SSA”) was part of the increasing understanding 
of federal power during that era and an important step on the path 
to national programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.  The SSA was, 
at heart, a federal income protection mechanism that partially em-
braced European models of social insurance.  Unlike the European 
prototype, though, the SSA continued state and local governmental 
responsibility for welfare programs.42  The SSA adopted and codified 
states’ categories of deserving poor into federal law by protecting the 
elderly, children, widows and widowers, blind, those otherwise dis-
abled, and the unemployed through income security.43  The SSA bill 
contained a directive to the Social Security Board to study health in-
surance, which could have afforded an opportunity to consider na-
tional remedies for increased medical needs.44  The American Medi-
cal Association (“AMA”) was so adamantly opposed to this study and 
to the specter of government-sponsored health insurance that this 
proposal had to be removed from the SSA lest the entire bill fail.45  
 
 40 See STARR, supra note 21, at 201 (explaining that the expansion of the railroads led to the 
development of extensive employee medical programs). 
 41 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (upholding application of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act to a farmer who exceeded the wheat allocations designed to re-
gulate the national wheat market); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1941) 
(upholding the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to production of lumber 
shipped in interstate commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 19, 
49 (1937) (upholding an application of the National Labor Relations Act to labor for a 
national steel company). 
 42 MARMOR & MARMOR, supra note 3, at 2. 
 43 See id. at 8–9. 
 44 See id. at 8 (stating that the original social security bill contained one line that com-
manded the Social Security Board to study the health insurance problem and report to 
Congress). 
 45 See MARMOR & MARMOR, supra note 3, at 8 (claiming that Edwin Witte, the executive di-
rector of the drafting committee for the social security bill, as well as President Roosevelt, 
believed that the Social Security Board study and the issue of government health insur-
ance could endanger the whole bill); STARR, supra note 21, at 268–69 (describing the 
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This pattern of healthcare reform being folded into a national debate 
about health insurance and then defeated by the AMA has occurred 
through the remainder of the twentieth century and into the twenty-
first.46 
In addition to federalizing the categories of deserving poor, the 
SSA contained an early form of cooperative federalism in its public 
assistance configuration, which laid the foundation for a hallmark of 
Medicaid’s structure and the second important thread in its history.  
The SSA provided federal funding to support state-based programs, 
but the states were not asked to alter their public assistance mechan-
isms to receive that funding.47  In other words, the states were free to 
implement federal funding as they saw fit, which could be described 
loosely as a system of federal-state cooperation but was really a set of 
federal grants to the states to continue providing assistance to the de-
serving poor with no conditions attached to the federal spending.  
Despite this lenient form of federal-state programmatic cooperation, 
concerns about states’ rights were articulated even at SSA bill-writing 
hearings.48  States were the locus of much economic and moral regu-
lation, and the ideas of national health insurance or national welfare 
programs were alien.  It is not surprising that the states retained con-
trol over welfare-type programs at that time. 
The two threads of deserving poor and states’ rights continued 
beyond the New Deal.  The call for universal health insurance was de-
feated in part by the advent of employer-sponsored medical insur-
ance as a tax benefit to both the employer and the employee during 
World War II.49  The middle class no longer needed government-
sponsored medical benefits, as they had during the Great Depression, 
which allowed the poor to be treated as a group with lesser needs that 
could be met differently from the rest of the population.50  Thus, the 
SSA amendments passed in 1950 were in part a response to rejection 
of the need for national health insurance (and the red scare).51  One 
 
steps that the AMA took to denounce compulsory health insurance and the sentiment 
among lawmakers that any health insurance amendment would defeat the entire bill). 
 46 STARR, supra note 21, at 296–98. 
 47 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 11 (describing the federal government as “merely a 
paymaster” and the Act as a “hodgepodge” of state and federal programs). 
 48 See id. at 12 (dismissing the fear of federal control over public assistance that was voiced 
during hearings on the 1935 legislation). 
 49 See id. at 23 (stating that better health services through available public assistance schemes 
was a viable political alternative to national health insurance in the 1940s). 
 50 STARR, supra note 21, at 270–71. 
 51 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 23 (characterizing the passage of the Social Secu-
rity Amendments of 1950 as a “temporary victory for those opposing national health in-
surance”). 
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new feature of the 1950 amendments was larger federal grants that 
required the states to create medical insurance for certain kinds of 
healthcare services such as hospital stays and physician visits.  In re-
turn, state welfare agencies received funds that they were able to pay 
directly to doctors and hospitals, called “vendor payments.”52  Vendor 
payments were limited to welfare recipients’ services, which contin-
ued the use of categories of deserving poor for benefit eligibility and 
increased federal oversight of state-based welfare programs very 
slightly. 
The years after the 1950 SSA amendments witnessed focused in-
terest on the medical and financial problems of the elderly, who were 
widely considered to qualify as deserving poor and who were increa-
singly politically powerful.  While the elderly pushed for health insur-
ance benefits that would mirror the SSA workers’ insurance program, 
a political willingness to assist impoverished (if not all) elderly 
emerged and became the program that immediately preceded Medi-
caid, referred to as Kerr-Mills.53 
Kerr-Mills was part of the 1960 amendments to the SSA and was 
yet another state-based program for providing healthcare to certain 
needy citizens.54  Kerr-Mills essentially extended the vendor payments 
of the 1950 SSA amendments, which had provided federal grants with 
few conditions on the spending.55  Kerr-Mills continued states’ limited 
help to the deserving poor, as well as states’ historical responsibility 
for welfare programs, while including little in the way of federal guid-
ance or demands for the provision of medical care.56  Kerr-Mills also 
strengthened the connection between welfare and healthcare, a cor-
relation that had no medical basis,57 and continued the federal gov-
 
 52 JOST, supra note 21, at 80. 
 53 See id. at 81 (expounding how the Social Security Act Amendments of 1960 created the 
Kerr-Mills program and its expanded coverage of the “medically needy”). 
 54 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 28. 
 55 STARR, supra note 21, at 368–69. 
 56 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 29 (describing the Kerr-Mills structure as an 
“open-ended federal cost-sharing” program where cost control was left to the states).  
Kerr-Mills contained a number of features that carried over into Medicaid, such as requir-
ing certain hospital and physician benefits, and providing all benefits state-wide.  Id. at 30 
(explaining that the program required all administrative subdivisions of a state to be cov-
ered); see also JOST, supra note 21, at 81 (claiming that the requirements for statewide 
coverage, found in the 1965 Medicaid Act, were found in the Kerr-Mills program). 
 57 This connection was broken by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 
1996, which changed welfare into a “workfare” block grant program of limited benefits 
for enrollees and for states.  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103 (1996).  Though breaking the 
tie between Medicaid and welfare made sense in many ways, it increased states’ adminis-
trative burden by decoupling what had been a streamlined process for entering the fed-
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ernment’s deferential posture toward state and local programs.58  
Aside from recurring proposals for universal health insurance, how-
ever, no federal plan for healthcare delivery or health insurance ex-
isted.  The ongoing medley of amendments to the SSA reflected the 
lack of programmatic coherence. 
Even with Kerr-Mills’ open-ended grants, states were uninterested 
or ultimately unable to sustain the costs of either traditional welfare 
programs or medical welfare programs.59  The states had requested 
and received money from the federal government to facilitate the 
continuation of medical welfare programs, but the voluntary nature 
of Kerr-Mills resulted in wealthier states fully using the federal fund-
ing while poorer states ignored it, and in the meantime healthcare 
costs grew while access diminished.60  In creating Kerr-Mills, the fed-
eral government hoped to alleviate states’ burdens while taking little 
responsibility for indigent populations and at the same time desired 
to contain costs of medical care—goals that were quixotic given how 
little procedural and substantive help Kerr-Mills actually extended to 
the poor and to the states in which they resided.  The will to look past 
state theories of pauperism and state responsibility for medicine re-
mained elusive.61 
B.  Kerr-Mills Redux:  Medicaid 
By the time Medicaid was created as part of the 1965 SSA amend-
ments, the underlying features of its predecessor spending programs 
were ingrained.  Most of the political will was directed toward the 
creation of Medicare, which was relatively uncontroversial in its re-
sponse to popular demand.62  Medicaid was an afterthought and 
plainly an extension of the existing Kerr-Mills modifications to the 
 
eral welfare system.  PRWORA is the model for many governors who are demanding Me-
dicaid be changed into a block grant program (as is the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program). 
 58 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 36 (noting that Kerr-Mills addressed both medical 
needs of the lower and middle classes and the cash needs of those on welfare). 
 59 Watson, supra note 33, at 950–51 (noting that poor states were afraid they could not af-
ford the program, even with a generous 80% federal match). 
 60 STARR, supra note 21, at 369 (noting that three years after the passage of Kerr-Mills, five 
large industrial states were receiving 90% of the federal funds under the program). 
 61 Id. at 366–67 (noting that the war on poverty did not include health insurance despite the 
well documented connection between poverty status and health status). 
 62 See id. at 368 (describing Medicare as the “overriding political issue” in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s that led to the passage of Kerr-Mills). 
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SSA.63  Medicaid contained many of the features of prior federal 
funding for medical care for the poor, including a sense that welfare 
was “gratuitous.”64  Perhaps most importantly, the Medicaid Act con-
tinued the two themes of deserving poor and states’ rights.  The con-
cern for states’ role in welfare had been articulated since the early 
federal assistance programs of the 1930s and, as was described above, 
continued in every iteration of the SSA amendments.65  This division 
of authority was codified in the Medicaid Act.66  The 1965 SSA 
amendments also carried forward the tie between welfare and gov-
ernment-sponsored payments for healthcare, a connection that was 
convenient but that was a mechanical continuation of the outdated 
views regarding pauperism.  Only certain poor were deemed worthy 
of government assistance, and they were not worthy enough for 
healthcare providers to be paid as much as they were for privately in-
sured patients.67 
Medicaid included improvements over the minimalist Kerr-Mills 
program, and it has persevered as the key healthcare safety net in this 
nation, but the extended life of Medicaid has also become a part of 
its weakness because of our path dependence.  The program is com-
plex, and a brief overview is helpful for understanding the import of 
PPACA’s Medicaid modifications. 
Medicaid was created as and continues to be open-ended federal 
funding to the states so long as they comply with the superstructure 
of the Medicaid Act.68  Medicaid was more generous than Kerr-Mills, 
and the vast majority of states were participating in the program with-
in a few years of its advent (all states now take part).69  When Medica-
id was created, it was targeted to cover the deserving poor, meaning 
the elderly, disabled, blind, pregnant women, and children—the 
 
 63 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 51 (“[T]he section of the Senate report dealing 
with Title XIX was entitled, ‘Improvement and Extension of Kerr-Mills Medical Assistance 
Program.’”). 
 64 JOST, supra note 21, at 65. 
 65 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 8, 12, 45 (noting the strong role of both Congress 
and the states in various public assistance programs passed since the 1930s, including the 
FERA program in 1935, OAI (“Old-Age Insurance”) in 1939, and Kerr-Mills in 1960). 
 66 See Medicaid and CHIP Payment Access Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006). 
 67 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 35 (noting that Kerr-Mills made lower payments 
than other health insurers and the disparity grew as healthcare costs increased). 
 68 Efforts to metamorphose Medicaid into a capped block grant have failed.  See, e.g., Jeanne 
M. Lambrew, Making Medicaid a Block Grant Program:  An Analysis of the Implications of Past 
Proposals, 83 MILBANK Q. 41, 46–47 (2005) (outlining the efforts of Newt Gingrich and 
George Bush to make a capped block grant part of federal Medicaid funding). 
 69 Arizona and Alaska were holdouts, with Arizona joining Medicaid in 1982 and Alaska 
joining in 1972. 
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same categories of sympathetic poverty that have existed all along.  
Medicaid simply extended the “principle of ‘medical indigency’ to all 
welfare categories.”70 The Medicaid Act created low poverty thre-
sholds for eligibility that varied by welfare category. 
Notwithstanding the continued reliance on notions of the deserv-
ing poor, the Medicaid Act ensured equality for Medicaid enrollees 
in ways that generally had not been included in predecessor pro-
grams.  An applicant who meets standards for poverty level and cate-
gorical eligibility receives Medicaid coverage in the form of baseline 
medical assistance.71  Baseline medical assistance is facilitated through 
statutory mechanisms that, for example, promise medical equality,72 
provide benefits throughout the state with no local variation,73 and 
allow enrollees to select their healthcare providers.74  States are sup-
posed to mainstream Medicaid enrollees, may not select among the 
mandatory categories of deserving poor, and are supposed to pay 
healthcare providers reasonably so that beneficiaries do not receive 
substandard care.75  Notably, as a condition of receiving federal fund-
ing, states must accept all applicants who meet both categorical eligi-
bility and financial eligibility, regardless of the state’s ability to pay for 
the medical assistance (which becomes especially important during 
economic downturns).76 
 
 70 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 51. 
 71 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8), (10) (2006).  Many people who are eligible for Medicaid are not 
in the program.  See Benjamin D. Sommers & Arnold M. Epstein, Medicaid Expansion—The 
Soft Underbelly of Health Care Reform?, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2085, 2085–87 (2010) (report-
ing study results showing that 61.7% of eligible adults are enrolled in Medicaid nation-
wide and highly variable from state to state). 
 72 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (2006) (mandating that medical assistance for Medicaid 
enrollees be equal in amount, scope, and duration to the assistance given to any other 
individual). 
 73 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1) (2006) (providing that a state medical assistance plan must “be 
in effect in all political subdivisions of that state”); see also STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 
4, at 58 (“[T]o become eligible for matching funds, a state plan had to be in effect in all 
political subdivisions of the state.”). 
 74 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (2006) (allowing Medicaid enrollees to choose their own 
practitioners and medical facilities).  “Freedom of choice” is at issue in states that are de-
nying Medicaid funding to Planned Parenthood.  See, e.g., Brad Cooper, Planned Parent-
hood Asks Judge to Block Cut in Funding, THE KANSAS CITY STAR, June 27, 2011, at B4 (de-
scribing litigation concerning new budget provisions in Kansas that would limit funding 
to planned parenthood). 
 75 See Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 14, at 418–26 (explaining these aspects of 
Medicaid more fully). 
 76 The equalizing aspects of the Medicaid Act have been the basis for enforcing Medicaid 
entitlements through section 1983.  Id. at 421–22; Rosenbaum, supra note 8, at 11 (de-
scribing that states cannot create queues, they must accept all eligible applicants). 
Dec. 2011] FEDERALIZING MEDICAID 447 
 
The Medicaid Act created new entitlements for the states as well, 
offering matching federal money in exchange for states’ agreement 
to fulfill certain conditions on those funds by providing medical assis-
tance to mandatory categories of deserving poor.77  The federal 
match ranges from 50% to 75% and is based, loosely, on the amount 
of money the state spends on Medicaid and the state’s per capita in-
come.78  The state must submit a “State Plan” to participate in Medica-
id, which explains how the state will comply with mandatory elements 
of Medicaid and the optional elements it chooses to engage.79  Once 
the State Plan is in place, states administer Medicaid with little to no 
oversight, but the federal government pays a large portion of state 
administrative expenses.  Generally administrative activities receive a 
50% federal match, but some receive higher matching rates,80 such as 
75% match for training and compensating medical professionals that 
work at the state Medicaid agency, 75% match for translators assisting 
in enrolling non-English-speaking families, 100% of costs for imple-
menting use of immigration verification systems, and a Medicaid 
Fraud Control Unit (“MCFU”) special match of 90%.81  Thus, the 
federal government not only pays about 60% of Medicaid medical 
expenses on average, but it also pays more than 50% of Medicaid’s 
administrative costs in the states, in addition to the costs of running 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the federal agency 
responsible for Medicaid. 
The original structure of Medicaid was modified so that the Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) was 
given authority to issue “waivers” that allow states to vary from the 
Medicaid Act; waivers often establish managed care administration of 
Medicaid.82  A number of waiver possibilities exist because the states 
 
 77 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006) (listing who must receive Medicaid services from the state); 
The Bipartisan Commission on the Medicaid Act of 2005, H.R. 985, 109th Cong. § 2(13) 
(2005) (“Medicaid is the single largest Federal grant-in-aid program to the States, ac-
counting for over 40 percent of all Federal grants to States.”). 
 78 FMAP calculations are published in the Federal Register each year.  See 76 Fed. Reg. 5811-
3 (Feb. 2, 2011) (calculating the adjusted Federal Medical Assistance Percentage for the 
first quarter of the fiscal year 2011). 
 79 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2006).  Additional services also can receive matching funds.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006) (defining services that qualify as “medical assistance” and there-
fore receive funding). 
 80 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) (2006) (listing the percentage of the state spending the federal 
government will match depending on the type of expenditure). 
 81 Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 433.15 (1979) (listing federal match rates for administration of 
Medicaid). 
 82 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (2006) (allowing the Secretary to waive the requirements of section 
1396a if it is cost effective and efficient and not inconsistent with the purposes of the 
Act). 
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are always seeking more flexibility in Medicaid.  Section 1915(b) 
waivers were the first permitted deviation from the Medicaid Act and 
were passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1981.83  Home and Community Based Waivers, known as Section 
1915(c) waivers, were also created in 1981.84  The third type of waiver, 
the Section 1115 waiver, offers the most flexibility and allows state 
experiments to cover the uninsured so long as states do not increase 
costs to the federal government.85  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
allowed states to simply amend their State Plans to implement ma-
naged care rather than requiring them to seek waivers.86  In 2005, the 
Deficit Reduction Act intended to afford states “unprecedented flex-
ibility.”87  States were permitted to provide only “benchmark cover-
age,”88 which meant that the equalizing services were not required;89 
or states could provide “benchmark-equivalent coverage,” which also 
relieved states of the traditional mandatory services.90  PPACA restricts 
state waiver flexibility to a degree, as it requires new forms of waiver 
oversight such as public hearings and annual reports.91 
Thus, despite its equalizing elements, Medicaid varies greatly from 
state to state, and studies show that waivers tend to decrease the 
amount and quality of care for Medicaid enrollees, particularly waiv-
ers occurring in the last decade or so.92  To be fair, some states have 
 
 83 See id. (recognizing waivers and incorporating them in to the Medicaid program). 
 84 See generally 42 C.F.R. § 441.300 (1992) (explaining that the purpose of 1915(c) waivers is 
to provide home and community based services that will allow individuals to avoid institu-
tionalization). 
 85 See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1994) (amending the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1115) (giv-
ing the Secretary discretion to appropriate funds for experimental projects not otherwise 
covered). 
 86 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a) (2005) (allowing states to force Medicaid participants to enroll 
in managed care as long as the requirement meets certain conditions). 
 87 Medicaid Program; State Flexibility for Medicaid Benefit Packages, 73 Fed. Reg. 9714, 
9715 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 88 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(1) (giving states the option of providing only “benchmark 
benefits” to certain populations). 
 89 See Medicaid Program; State Flexibility for Medicaid Benefit Packages, supra note 87, at 
9715, 9718, 9721, 9727 (“A State has the option to amend its State plan to provide 
benchmark or benchmark-equivalent coverage without regard to comparability . . . and 
other requirements in order to tailor and provide the coverage to the individuals.”). 
 90 See id. at 9715 (incorporating alternative benchmark packages in place of mandatory ser-
vices); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(1), (b)(2)–(3) (permitting and defining “bench-
mark” coverage).  Additionally, Medicaid enrollees may be treated differently within eli-
gibility categories.  See Rosenbaum, supra note 8, at 33 (detailing state governments’ 
desire to provide certain “optional populations” with only benchmark coverage). 
 91 See PPACA § 10201 (adding reporting requirements to Section 1115 waivers, both at the 
state and the federal levels). 
 92 See Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Role of Section 1115 Waivers in Medi-
caid and CHIP:  Looking Back and Looking Forward, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
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been able to do more with waivers, especially Section 1115 waivers.93  
New York stands out as a state that has maximized enrollment 
through Section 1115 waivers, as does Massachusetts in its pursuit of 
universal coverage.94 
Notably, when senior citizens were lobbying Congress for a 
stronger program than Kerr-Mills, they deliberately rejected state-by-
state variation in the benefits they were seeking.95  The AMA for-
warded a proposal to expand the Kerr-Mills federal-state structure, 
but the more popular and successful proposal was to create “compul-
sory health insurance” through Social Security taxes.  The idea was to 
create a hospital insurance program for all elderly people that was a 
mechanism of income protection and a product of compassion, em-
pathy, and political power.  Though the idea of state-based deviation 
was rejected for the elderly, who comprised one of the historic cate-
gories of deserving poor (and were to become elevated permanently 
by Medicare’s social insurance program), the poor were still subject 
to state-by-state variation in benefits. 
Thus, Medicaid’s cooperative federalism structure could be de-
scribed as a tenacious, yet basically unplanned, institutional structure.  
This jointly shared responsibility was not a thoughtful way to high-
light Our Federalism’s journey from dual sovereignty to cooperative 
federalism.  The states had been dealing with welfare-type issues, and 
the federal government did not traditionally intervene in such mat-
ters, and so Medicaid built on what came before; the program was 
remarkably path dependent. 
 
FOUNDATION, 1, 6 (Mar. 2009), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7874.pdf (“How-
ever, states had limited interest and success in expanding coverage under HIFA, and 
waivers instead began to increasingly focus on cost control as the nation moved into an 
economic downturn.”); see also Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” Approach to 
Medicaid:  Empirical Evidence That Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States Harms Public 
Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 982–83 (2001–2002) (criticizing increased state control over Medi-
caid because it leads to less access to medical care and worse care when provided). 
 93 A list of waivers organized by state, waiver type, and date of approval is available on the 
CMS website.  Medicaid Waivers and Demonstrations List, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/MWDL/list. 
asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 94 See generally Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, supra note 92, at 7 (reviewing 
the success of different Section 1115 waivers and praising the expansion in coverage 
created by the Massachusetts waiver plan). 
 95 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 45 (explaining that the elderly pressured Congress 
for a social security benefit “free of variations by state”). 
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C.  Enter:  PPACA 
PPACA is more than just another amendment to the SSA that 
tinkers with Medicaid’s original structure.  At the meta level, PPACA 
facilitates access to healthcare by targeting the problems of America’s 
fifty million uninsured.96  The Act regulates private insurance practic-
es that serve as barriers to health insurance enrollment and ensures 
that those restrictions on health insurance will not be insurmountably 
expensive by penalizing people who do not elect to obtain health in-
surance in the newly open market.97  Recognizing that private insur-
ance is not a straightforward option for the poor, even with subsi-
dies,98 PPACA created what is arguably the biggest philosophical 
change in Medicaid since its inception and a start for federalization 
of the program:  PPACA eliminated the “deserving poor” require-
ment.99 
PPACA reformulated Medicaid so that all Americans up to 133% 
of the federal poverty level are eligible as of 2014.100  Single, childless 
adults who are not elderly or disabled are eligible for Medicaid for 
the first time in its history.  This philosophical shift is historic and yet 
appears to have occurred with little debate in Congress.  Until PPACA 
was enacted, only the deserving poor were eligible for Medicaid and 
all of its predecessor programs, one of the two immutable threads de-
scribed above.  Considering that the welfare/deserving poor/medical 
assistance connection dates to colonial America, this is a sea change.  
The expansion results in two steps toward federalizing Medicaid. 
First, PPACA essentially has federalized the definition of deserving 
poor by rejecting states’ restrictive categorizations.  Thus far, no 
states’ rights outcry has accompanied this change.  States have chal-
lenged the constitutionality of PPACA only based on the economics, 
rather than the philosophy, of the Medicaid expansion.  Admittedly, 
the “categories” of poverty have not disappeared entirely, as they are 
still relevant for the federal match, covered benefits, and other ad-
 
 96 CARMAN DENAVAS-WALT ET. AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:  2009, at 22 (2010), available at http://www. 
census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf (reporting the number of uninsured at an all-
time high of 50.7 million, 16.7% of the population, in 2009). 
 97 See PPACA § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1) (prohibiting a penalty against those who can-
not afford insurance). 
 98 See id. (waiving mandatory minimum coverage for people with income below a certain 
level). 
 99 See PPACA § 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 1936a (2010) (expanding Medicaid to include not only 
“deserving poor” but also everyone else whose income is below 133% of the poverty lev-
el). 
100 Id. (giving states the option to increase eligibility before 2014). 
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ministrative matters.101  But, the federal government has ceased Medi-
caid’s reliance on outdated notions of deserving poor vis-à-vis pauper-
ism. 
Second, PPACA further federalizes Medicaid by creating a “su-
permatch” of federal funding for the newly eligible Medicaid popula-
tion.102  PPACA provides an initial 100% payment for the new enrol-
lees that phases down to a 90% federal match by 2020 and remains at 
that level indefinitely.103  The supermatch only applies to the newly 
covered population, which is substantial in terms of raw numbers 
(projected to be 18 million new enrollees).104  Thus, states have to pay 
for only a small percentage of the cost of the new Medicaid popula-
tion.  Even with the generous match, states have claimed in highly 
publicized litigation that the expansion of Medicaid is coercive and 
unconstitutional, which will be discussed further below.105 
Before now, it appears that serious discussions to federalize Medi-
caid had not occurred since the 1970s and early 1980s.  In 1970, the 
McNerney Report suggested creating a stronger federal framework 
for Medicaid, including total federal financing for a set minimum of 
benefits and phasing out categorical eligibility requirements (a pro-
posal that came to fruition a mere forty years after the report).106  
Senators Long and Ribicoff also proposed federalization of Medicaid 
 
101 See Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program Provisions:  America’s Affordable Health 
Choices Act & America’s Healthy Future Act, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://www.kff.org/
healthreform/ (last updated Oct. 15, 2009) (analyzing the provisions of recent health 
care legislation that relate to Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program). 
102 CHIP also has a very generous federal match, which helped to create the precedent for 
the supermatch structure in PPACA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee (2010) (promising that the 
Secretary will pay the state an amount equal to the enhanced FMAP for certain categories 
of expenditure). 
103 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. § 1201 
(2010) (tying up some of the loose ends from the PPACA negotiations). 
104 See Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 
Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” as 
Amended, 3 (Apr. 22, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA
_2010-04-22.pdf (estimating financial and coverage effects of certain provisions of the 
PPACA through the year 2019). 
105 See Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 771–72 (E.D. Va. 2010) (challenging the 
minimum essential coverage provision as unconstitutional because it is outside the scope 
of the Commerce Clause authority, is not a legitimate exercise of the power to tax, and is 
in direct conflict with Virginia state law); see also Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 
2011) (granting summary judgment and declaring  PPACA unconstitutional).  
106 WALTER J. MCNERNEY, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAID AND RELATED PROGRAMS 
13–14 (1970) [hereinafter MCNERNEY REPORT]; STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 15–
16 (explaining the history of government involvement in providing “essential services” to 
certain members of the population). 
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in 1970–1971.107  The states supported federalizing Medicaid in the 
early 1970s.108  President Reagan proposed federalizing Medicaid to 
Congress and the states in 1982, but this proposal was part of an ef-
fort to shrink the program through federal control, and the states 
were not interested in the programmatic “trade” that Mr. Reagan de-
sired, which would have involved passing welfare and food stamps to 
the states.109  More recently, the nonprofit Urban Institute reviewed 
the New Federalism movement of the 1990s in a series of essays that 
revealed the more modern failings of the joint federal-state structure 
of Medicaid and that ultimately suggested a larger federal role in 
Medicaid.110  It seems strange that Medicaid’s path dependent institu-
tional structure has not been attacked more frequently. 
 
107 See National Health Insurance—A Brief History of Reform Efforts in the U.S., KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. 5 (Mar. 2009), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7871.pdf (providing a 
timeline of healthcare reform efforts in the United States and discussing the proposal of 
Senators Long and Ribicoff more fully). 
108 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 4, at 237 (“[T]here were few advocates of states’ rights 
pressing for returning welfare medicine to the states.”). 
109 See generally President’s Federalism Initiative:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 97th Cong. 1 (1982) (debating and criticizing the President’s proposal to adjust the 
balance of power between the federal government and state governments); Timothy J. 
Conlan, Ambivalent Federalism:  Intergovernmental Policy in the Reagan Administration, in 
ADMINISTERING THE NEW FEDERALISM 15, 21–22 (Lewis G. Bender & James A. Stever, eds., 
1986) (describing Reagan’s plans to federalize Medicaid and devolve responsibility for 
other programs to the states); see also GRANNEMANN & PAULY, supra note 20, at 95 (explor-
ing and quickly rejecting the idea of federalizing Medicaid fully in favor of a streng-
thened cooperative federalism program).  One of the reasons Grannemann and Pauly re-
jected federalizing Medicaid was the “difficulty of structuring benefits to account for 
differences in local medical care prices and local delivery systems, as well as the need to 
satisfy the desires of some voters for provision of extra benefits to the poor in their own 
geographic area.”  Id.  The book was written, however, before the prospective payment 
system was instituted for Medicare, a system that accounts for variations in local wages 
and other costs that can be affected by geography.  See Social Security Amendments of 
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww) (“[T]he sec-
retary shall adjust the proportion (as estimated by the Secretary from time to time) of 
hospitals’ costs which are attributable to wages and wage-related costs, of the national and 
regional DRG prospective payment rates computer under subparagraph (G) for area dif-
ferences in hospital wage levels . . . .”).  The prospective payment system is not perfect, 
but it does address this concern.  See, e.g., Bellevue Hosp. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 443 F.3d 163, 
168–69 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the Secretary must calculate payments based in 
part on the geographic area of the health care provider). 
110 See FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY, supra note 14; John Holahan, Alan Weil & Joshua M. 
Wiener, Which Way for Federalism and Health Policy?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 1, 326–29 (2003) 
(drawing on Federalism and Health Policy and suggesting options to improve the federal-
state Medicaid relationship, including reform that maintains the current structure for 
long-term care but nationalizes the financing and administration of acute-care services); 
Alan Weil, There’s Something about Medicaid, 22 HEALTH AFF. 13, 26 (2003) (recognizing 
the benefit of shifting Medicaid costs to the federal government because of stability and a 
broader tax base).  There have been several other proposals relating to this question.  See 
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PPACA was another failed attempt (albeit a weak one) at national 
health insurance, and Medicaid modifications have historically died 
when national insurance debates have failed.111  But this time, Medica-
id has been fundamentally altered.  Nevertheless, although PPACA 
federalizes the Medicaid program in two ways, it continues the un-
thinking divided governmental responsibility for the Medicaid popu-
lation, which has the states decrying the legislation as violating fede-
ralism principles. 
III.  THE STATES’ RIGHTS THREAD:  A FEDERALISM CONUNDRUM 
The thread of states’ rights continues to be a part of the pro-
gram’s institutional architecture.  To evaluate this path dependence, 
this section explores the traditional arguments for the value of fede-
ralism as expressed by the modern Supreme Court.  States’ rights fre-
quently arise in debates about the Medicaid program, but as Justice 
Black famously explained, Our Federalism does not require that the 
 
Rosemary Barber-Madden & Jonathan B. Kotch, Maternity Care Financing:  Universal Access 
of Universal Care?, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 797, 808 (1990) (recommending federali-
zation of Medicaid in the context of a universal maternity care plan); see also Timothy 
Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature of the Medicaid Entitlement, 22 HEALTH AFF. 145, 152 
(2003) (posing the possibility of nationalizing Medicaid as a response to federal court 
shut down of section 1983 causes of action, but only in passing); Sara Rosenbaum & Kath-
leen A. Malloy, The Law of Unintended Consequences:  The 1996 Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and Its Impact on Medicaid for Families with Children, 60 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1470 (1999) (mentioning in conclusion that Congress could choose 
to federalize Medicaid to simplify the problems of PWORA); Rosenbaum, supra note 8, at 
27 (stating that “the Medicaid funding formula has resulted in an unworkable distribu-
tion of financial obligations, devolving too much responsibility to states, whose economies 
are relatively ill-equipped to withstand the punishment of rapidly rising health care costs” 
but not proposing a solution to the problem).  See generally Sara Rosenbaum & David 
Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 48 (2001) (discussing the difficul-
ties involved with allocating more responsibilities to the federal government, including 
the federal budget along with opposition to strengthening a direct government entitle-
ment program). 
111 Even hints of a federally sponsored government plan in the state-based exchanges re-
ceived cries of “socialized medicine,” the classic attack on any form of national health in-
surance in the United States.  See STARR, supra, note 21, at 55 (explaining the history of 
the term socialized medicine); Uwe E. Reinhardt, What Is ‘Socialized Medicine’?:  A Taxono-
my of Health Care Systems, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (May 8, 2009, 6:48 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/what-is-socialized-medicine-a-
taxonomy-of-health-care-systems (describing different schemes of social and health insur-
ance in the context of the health reform debate); see also Jacob S. Hacker, Let’s Try a Dose.  
We’re Bound to Feel Better., WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR2008032102743_pf.html (describing and de-
bunking the long history of rejecting governmental healthcare solutions as “socialized 
medicine”). 
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states automatically win.112  Nevertheless, federalism plays an impor-
tant role in the litigation regarding the Medicaid expansion, which 
will also be discussed in this section for purposes of understanding 
the federalization that has already occurred as well as the federaliza-
tion that will be suggested in Part IV. 
A.  Searching for a Coherent Federalism 
1.  The “Federalism Revolution” 
The modern Supreme Court has revived federalism as a doctrine 
that protects states from overreaching by the federal government.113  
Restoring federalism as an active limit on the enumerated powers of 
 
112 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  Justice Black coined the phrase “Our Federalism” 
in this case, and he wrote: 
[Our Federalism] does not mean blind deference to “States’ Rights” any more 
than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National 
Government and its courts.  The Framers rejected both these courses.  What the 
concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate in-
terests of both State and National Governments . . . . 
  Id. at 44; see also ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
30–67, 136–66 (2010) (tracing the ideological roots of American federalism and describ-
ing the parliamentary power over the colonies that formed a theoretical basis for allowing 
a two-tiered government).  Although the colonies were understood to be skeptical of a 
centralized government after various injustices imposed by the British from afar, accord-
ing to Professor LaCroix, the notion that a central government and local governments 
can have concurrent and independent power was deliberate, not an accident of the colo-
nies becoming a nation.  Id. at 30–67.  Professor LaCroix also explains that “[o]ur Fede-
ralism” inherently requires the supreme power of the federal government and compel-
lingly describes the “federal negative” that would have given Congress the ability to 
negate state laws, an idea that was rejected for stronger federal judicial review but that al-
so helps to explain why federalism should not automatically be equated to states’ rights.  
Id. at 136–66. 
113 Addressing the multiple concepts of federalism in an article this length is impossible.  
But, it is helpful to have a working definition of federalism, and Professors Feeley and 
Rubin provide a pithy version:  “Federalism, as the term is used in political science and 
legal scholarship, refers to a means of governing a polity that grants partial autonomy to 
geographically defined subdivisions of the polity.”  FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 16, at 12.  
Professor Kramer wrote a longer, also useful, definition: 
A federal system is one in which political power is divided between central and 
subordinate authorities. . . . [It] is distinguished from other decentralized setups 
by the additional fact that leaders in its subordinate units don’t depend on the 
central government for their political authority.  Most definitions of federalism as-
sume further that the subordinate units possess enclaves of jurisdiction that can-
not be invaded by the central government. . . . But so long as the subordinate units 
are able successfully to obtain some share of governmental power, it’s not impor-
tant that their jurisdiction be fixed over any particular area.  Rather, the critical 
feature of a federal system is that officials of the subordinate units are not ap-
pointed, and cannot be fired, by officials of the central government. 
  Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 n.5 (1994) (citations 
omitted). 
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Congress was one of Justice Rehnquist’s projects,114 but the resulting 
case law is not totally coherent.  One consistent theme has been dual 
sovereignty as an enforcing principle,115 seen in Gregory v. Ashcroft, New 
York v. United States, and Printz v. United States.116  Indeed, the “federal-
ism revolution” arguably began with Gregory, a case that is cited fre-
quently for its enumeration of federalism’s virtues.117 
In Gregory, Justice O’Connor famously described the historic and 
structural nature of federalism as “dual sovereignty” and the virtues of 
federalism as having four highlights: 
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people nu-
merous advantages.  It assures a decentralized government that will be 
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increas-
es opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows 
for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes 
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a 
mobile citizenry.118 
The “dual sovereignty” terminology was notable because many had 
described the United States as having abandoned the founding con-
cept of “layer cake” dual sovereignty for “marble cake” federalism, an 
allusion to the modern prevalence of cooperative federalism.119  The 
 
114 See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE:  INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 101 
(2007) (“Throughout the 1990s, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and (as ever) O’Connor tried to 
revitalize the doctrine of states’ rights, ruling that several federal laws impinged on as-
pects of state sovereignty.  These developments were sometimes called a ‘federalism revo-
lution,’ but that now seems an exaggeration.”). 
115 After World War II and the New Deal, dual sovereignty seemed an obsolete conception of 
federalism.  See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–4 
(1950) (describing how dual federalism came to a natural end after the world wars and 
the industrialization of America).  The idea of dual federalism, as articulated by the Su-
preme Court in the early twentieth century, was not protective of states’ rights.  Id. at 15–
17.  Cooperative federalism eventually grew under a stronger, centralized national gov-
ernment.  Id. at 19–23. 
116 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
117 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; see also FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 16, at 22 (describing Gregory as 
“perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court’s leading statement on the virtues of federalism”).  Gre-
gory and subsequent federalism decisions were foreshadowed by Justice O’Connor’s con-
currence/dissent in FERC v. Mississippi, which extolled the virtues of the “experiment of 
the states” and described the importance of dual sovereignty.  See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 789–90 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
118 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; see also FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 16, at 22–29 (deconstructing 
the advantages of federalism for the United States). 
119 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:  Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815 (1998) (“It is com-
monplace to observe that ‘dual federalism’ is dead, replaced by something variously 
called ‘cooperative federalism,’ ‘intergovernmental relations,’ or ‘marble cake federal-
ism.’”); see also FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 16, at 75 (describing the idea of “marble cake” 
cooperative federalism). 
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use of federal funding to incentivize nationally determined policy at 
the state level seems to undercut the divided and divisive nature of 
“dual sovereignty,” which seems not to consider the possibility of in-
tergovernmental collaboration.120 
In the next federalism revolution decision, New York v. United 
States, the Court re-emphasized the divided nature of dual sovereignty 
that it had underlined in Gregory but also described that Congress had 
two major mechanisms for “influencing” state policy:  spending for 
the general welfare, and regulating activity under the Commerce 
Clause by preempting state law.121  The majority noted, “[w]here the 
recipient of federal funds is a State . . . the conditions attached to the 
funds by Congress may influence a State’s legislative choices.”122  Pa-
radoxically, this federalism analysis aggrandizes congressional author-
ity because Congress need not include state legislatures in federal po-
licymaking.123  Ultimately, the Court struck down the law at issue as 
impermissible “commandeering” of state legislative function that ei-
ther exceeded Commerce Clause authority or violated the Tenth 
Amendment by “coercing” the states to comply with a federal scheme 
rather than merely “encouraging” compliance.124 
Thus, the federalism revolution approved of cooperative federal-
ism while at the same time underlining the importance of dual sove-
 
120 Hills, Jr., supra note 119, at 826 (explaining that the arguments for dual sovereignty prove 
too much by failing to acknowledge the utility of federal-state voluntary cooperation). 
121 New York, 505 U.S. at 167–68 (describing approvingly examples of regulatory schemes un-
der the Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause that adhere to the idea of a partner-
ship between the federal government and the states); id. at 171–72 (upholding aspects of 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act as being consistent with cooperative federal-
ism). 
122 Id. at 165–67.  The majority reiterated this point:  “[T]he Constitution . . . permits the 
Federal Government to hold out incentives to the States as a means of encouraging them 
to adopt suggested regulatory schemes.”  Id. at 188. 
123 Id. at 210 (White, J., dissenting) (“The ultimate irony of the decision today is that in its 
formalistically rigid obeisance to ‘federalism,’ the Court gives Congress fewer incentives 
to defer to the wishes of state officials in achieving local solutions to local problems.”). 
124 See id. at 175–77.  A few years later, the decision in Printz underlined the same themes as 
New York, though Printz involved executive officer “dragooning” rather than legislative act 
“commandeering.”  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (describing the 
structural requirement of dual sovereignty in the Constitution); id. at 928 (stating that 
ministerial tasks do not improve the concern that state officers are “‘dragooned’ into ad-
ministering federal law”).  Interestingly, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence/dissent in FERC 
v. Mississippi previewed the “conscription” concerns addressed by the Printz majority.  
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 784 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).  Professor Hills has urged that the way to understand New York and Printz 
is protecting state autonomy, not outdated dual sovereignty; thus, it is permissible for the 
federal government to purchase state cooperation just as it would purchase services from 
any private actor.  See Hills, Jr., supra note 119, at 815–17, 824. 
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reignty.  The Court described cooperative federalism as “a partner-
ship between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a 
shared objective” that could be pursued either through spending or 
preemption.125  In other words, the federal government could buy 
state collaboration, or in the face of state objections, the federal gov-
ernment could go it alone.  Many expected cooperative federalism to 
also be reined in by the Rehnquist Court, and hopes were high that 
the spending power too would be subject to Tenth Amendment re-
strictions.  But, while the Rehnquist Court revived a judicially en-
forced Tenth Amendment juxtaposed with the Commerce Clause 
power, it did not do so with the Spending Clause power.  In fact, even 
though South Dakota v. Dole created a five-part test for limiting federal 
conditions on spending, the Court has not limited the spending pow-
er by the Tenth Amendment since 1936.126  The reluctance to apply 
the Tenth Amendment to spending programs will be important for 
the Medicaid expansion litigation.127 
The merits of federalism through the experiment of the states was 
oft repeated and is worth mentioning in its own right, as it is the justi-
fication most likely to be cited for continuing the current Medicaid 
cooperative federalism structure.  Justice O’Connor in particular fa-
vored the laboratory of the states theory (even when a case did not 
hinge on federalism).  For instance, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health,128 the majority was concerned primarily with the 
constitutional question of the right to refuse medical treatment,129 but 
 
125 New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992)). 
126 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66, 74-–75 (1936) (reading the Spending Clause 
broadly to be a separate enumerated power in the Hamiltonian sense, but then striking 
down the tax penalties of the Agricultural Adjustment Act under the aegis of the Tenth 
Amendment).  This issue has also been mentioned by Justice Scalia in a more recent case.  
See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686–87 
(1999) (“Congress has no obligation to use its Spending Clause power to disburse funds 
to the States; such funds are gifts. . . . [I]n cases involving conditions attached to federal 
funding, we have acknowledged that the financial inducement offered by Congress might 
be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  This statement provides insight into the deference to the ex-
ercises of the spending power, given the perception that Congress’s choice to spend is a 
“gift.” 
127 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in United States v. Comstock obliquely indicated interest in 
limiting the Spending Power more.  See 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967–68 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
128 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (acknowledging a competent patient’s right to refuse medical 
treatment and a state’s ability to demand clear and convincing evidence of an incompe-
tent patient’s desire to have treatment withdrawn). 
129 Id. at 277 (“This is the first case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue 
whether the United States Constitution grants what is in the common parlance referred 
to as a ‘right to die.’”). 
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Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was protective of states’ right to be 
“laborator[ies]” for “crafting appropriate procedures for safeguard-
ing incompetents’ liberty interests” in order to find consensus on the 
appropriate procedures.130  Likewise, Justice O’Connor reiterated the 
desirability of the laboratory of the states in Washington v. Gluck-
sburg.131  Her brief concurrence noted that states were studying 
whether physician-assisted death should be permitted, approved of 
these state experiments, and reiterated that this was an “appropriate 
task” for the “laboratory” of the states in “the first instance.”132 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor concurred jointly in United States 
v. Lopez133 and here too articulated the desirability of the laboratory of 
the states, writing: 
While it is doubtful that any State . . . would argue that it is wise policy to 
allow students to carry guns on school premises, considerable disagree-
ment exists about how best to accomplish that goal.  In this circumstance, 
the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may 
perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various 
solutions where the best solution is far from clear.134 
Justice O’Connor, as a former state legislator, clearly believed whole-
heartedly in the spirit of the laboratory of the states.135  She wrote 
another such comment in Gonzales v. Raich, wherein she lamented 
that upholding the federal power to enforce the Controlled Sub-
stances Act “extinguishes that experiment” (of legalizing medical ma-
rijuana for pain).136 
In many of these cases, the state was struggling with new policy 
questions such as physician-assisted death, medical marijuana for 
pain, or the right to refuse advanced and invasive medical technolo-
gies.  States were often wrestling with policy that the federal govern-
ment had not tackled (even in Raich, this was true, as the National In-
stitutes of Health have barely studied medical marijuana).  Small 
scale experiments may make sense in such circumstances.  There is 
 
130 Id. at 292 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
131 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  The majority’s opinion declined to find a right famously framed as 
“a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”  Id. at 
723. 
132 Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
133 514 U.S. 549, 568–83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
134 Id. at 581. 
135 See TOOBIN, supra note 114, at 46–47 (describing Justice O’Connor’s personal history). 
136 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 43 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Robert A. Mi-
kos, On the Limits of Supremacy:  Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize 
Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1438 (2009) (explaining why state policy regarding 
medical marijuana is not necessarily trumped by federal law, despite Justice O’Connor’s 
“bleak appraisal of state power” in her dissent). 
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little analysis, however, as to the actual value of such experiments, the 
possibility that a national standard would be superior, or any ac-
knowledgement that such experiments could have negative effects, 
but the experiments were at least within the understood concept of 
state “laboratories.” 
On the other hand, cooperative federalism programs inherently 
involve centralized policy.  If a state agrees to comply with federal 
policy in exchange for funding to facilitate compliance with that na-
tional policy, then it seems the state is inherently giving up its “right” 
to experiment.  Protecting dual sovereignty in this context makes lit-
tle sense, especially if the Court places few limits on the spending 
power.  Further, the states want to have their cake and eat it too—
seeking money and rejecting restrictions on those funds.  In the case 
of Medicaid, as I will discuss further below, this is especially true. 
2.  The Roberts Court Begins to Reveal Its Federalism Cards 
Although the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution has been 
much discussed, until recently observers have found the Roberts 
Court’s approach to federalism to be opaque, as the Court had not 
issued an opinion that luxuriates in federalism like the Rehnquist 
Court had done.137  This vagueness changed with a case decided late 
in the October 2010 term, Bond v. United States.138  Bond posed the is-
sue of whether a criminal defendant has standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute under which she is charged by raising 
Tenth Amendment concerns, which are typically expressed by 
states.139  Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, held that 
the defendant had standing to raise the Tenth Amendment question, 
even though no state was party to the case, because “[f]ederalism is 
more than an exercise in setting the boundary between different in-
stitutions of government for their own integrity.  ‘State sovereignty is 
not just an end in itself:  “Rather, federalism secures to citizens the 
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”’”140  The 
 
137 See Minutes from a Convention of the Federalist Society, The Roberts Court and Federalism, 4 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 330 (2009) (discussing the Roberts Court’s treatment of federalism 
issues); see generally Robin Kundis Craig, Administrative Law in the Roberts Court:  The First 
Four Years, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 69 (2010) (analyzing the Roberts Court’s administrative law-
related decisions and cases addressing federalism); Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Bor-
rowed:  The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33 (2009) (outlining chang-
ing conceptions of federalism throughout history). 
138 Bond v. United States, No. 09–1227, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 16, 2011) (majority opinion). 
139 Id. at 1. 
140 Id. at 9 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)). 
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Court quoted the four virtues of federalism from Gregory, then con-
tinued, 
the individual liberty secured by federalism is not simply derivative of the 
rights of the States. 
. . . . 
. . . An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the 
constitutional balance between the National Government and the States 
when the enforcement of those laws causes injury . . . . Fidelity to prin-
ciples of federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate.141 
Given that the defendant was challenging the constitutionality of 
the statute under which she was charged, it is unsurprising that the 
Court held that she had standing.  As Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence 
noted, due process instructs us that an unconstitutional law cannot 
create a crime under which a person may be convicted.142  Notably, 
Justice Ginsburg wrote her analysis in about two pages and with no 
reference to principles of federalism.143  It appears that Justice Ken-
nedy was keen on reiterating the Rehnquist Court’s principles of fe-
deralism; his opinion virtually basks in it.  Though this analysis may 
not be surprising for a Court that is considered to be quite conserva-
tive, the timing is notable.  The dicta regarding federalism in Bond re-
flects quite closely some of the arguments being made in the chal-
lenges to PPACA’s constitutionality. 
Bond can be read in conjunction with at least three other cases to 
help us understand the Roberts Court’s interpretation of federalism.  
Decided during the 2005 term before Justice O’Connor retired, Jus-
tice Kennedy’s majority in Gonzales v. Oregon could be read as a labor-
atory of the states decision, much in the nature of his concurrence 
with Justice O’Connor in Lopez.144  In Oregon, the Court struck down 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s interpretation of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (“CSA”) to render state physician assisted death laws il-
legal.  Such laws generally exempt physicians from state criminal lia-
bility when particular procedures are followed that lead to 
prescribing death-inducing drugs for terminally ill patients.  The ma-
jority engaged in statutory interpretation and spent little time actually 
discussing state autonomy, as Justice Thomas’s dissent pointedly 
noted.145  Nevertheless, practically speaking, states’ ability to experi-
 
141 Id. at 9–10. 
142 Id. at 1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
143 Id. at 1–2. 
144 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); see Craig, supra note 137, at 112 (describing the 
Court’s reliance on a states’ rights analysis). 
145 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 301 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy wrote: 
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ment with physician-assisted death was protected by the decision, a 
result that aligns with Justice O’Connor’s Glucksberg concurrence. 
The first Spending Clause case the Roberts Court decided, Arling-
ton Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, was very protec-
tive of states in cooperative federalism programs.146  The majority in 
Arlington described the Dole test as requiring “clear notice” for condi-
tions on spending so that states would fully understand the implica-
tions of accepting federal funds.  This was a deliberate narrowing of 
the “unambiguous[]” conditions language and more protective of 
states receiving federal funding than the original language of Dole.147 
The 2010 decision in United States v. Comstock was anticipated to be 
a major federalism decision, but Justice Breyer’s majority, which in-
cluded Chief Justice Roberts, largely dismissed federalism concerns 
based on the federal law’s “accommodation of state interests.”148  Writ-
ing that the federal government had the power to create the civil de-
tention statute in question under Necessary and Proper Clause au-
thority, Justice Breyer reiterated language from New York that if 
Congress has an enumerated power, then the Tenth Amendment in-
trinsically is not an issue.149  The majority further noted that the fed-
eral government had accounted for the states in its statutory scheme, 
which contained a preference for state detention of released federal 
felons.150  In this instance, it appears the states did not want to “expe-
 
[T]he statute manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally.  
The silence is understandable given the structure and limitations of federalism, 
which allow the States great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the 
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.  The struc-
ture and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical pro-
fession regulated under the States’ police powers. . . . Even though regulation of 
health and safety is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern, there is 
no question that the Federal Government can set uniform national standards in 
these areas. 
  Id. at 270–71 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (looking 
at the federal offer of funding from the state’s point of view and demanding clear notice 
regarding any conditions on the funds); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Liti-
gation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 350–51 (2008)(explaining that in Arlington the 
court “went out if its way” to highlight the “clear notice” principle); Nicole Huberfeld, 
Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for States in Federal Healthcare Pro-
grams, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441 (2008) (discussing the Court’s ruling in Arlington and its effect 
of requiring Congress to provide a clear notice to the states of conditions on federal 
spending). 
147 Arlington, 548 U.S. at 296 (citation omitted); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 
(1987). 
148 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1962–63 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
149 Id. at 1962. 
150 Id. at 1962–63. 
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riment,” as a majority of states supported the federal government’s 
responsibility for released prisoners.151 
Justice Thomas’s dissent, joined by Justice Scalia, read federal 
power quite narrowly and made much of the five-part analysis the ma-
jority used to analyze the federal statute in Comstock,152 but Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence may be the most noteworthy in terms of fe-
deralism, especially in relation to the Spending Clause.153  Justice 
Kennedy wrote that the majority relied on a spending case for part of 
its Necessary and Proper Clause analysis,154 and then stated that the 
“spending power is not designated as such in the Constitution” but is 
part of the General Welfare Clause.155  Justice Kennedy then contin-
ued:  “The limits upon the spending power have not been much dis-
cussed, but if the relevant standard is parallel to the Commerce 
Clause cases, then the limits and the analytic approach in those pre-
cedents should be respected.”156  Justice Kennedy then expressed 
concern about the Court’s limited reading of the Tenth Amendment, 
a concern that was perhaps alleviated with his opinion in Bond. 
Arguably the Kennedy concurrence was trying to draw lines be-
tween the various enumerated powers Congress can exercise and how 
they may play out differently through the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, but the narrow reading of the Spending Clause seems to go 
beyond interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause to a broader 
statement about the nature of the power itself and yet-to-be-found 
limits on that power.  Supporters of the constitutionality of PPACA 
point to the majority’s broad analysis of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in Comstock, which may be interpreted as the Court deferring 
to the federal government with little concern for protecting an area 
of traditional state regulation.  But Justice Kennedy’s comments on 
the Spending Clause read as an invitation for a spending power case 
so that the Court can rein in Congress’s power.  While this may not 
matter for the minimum coverage aspect of the ongoing PPACA liti-
gation, it will be vastly important for the Medicaid aspect of the ex-
pansion challenge. 
To sum up, the Rehnquist Court began a federalism revolution 
that now has been at least partially adopted by the Roberts Court.  
Recent cases give us reason to believe that the Tenth Amendment will 
 
151 Id. at 1970. (Alito, J., concurring). 
152 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
153 Id. at 1965–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
154 Id. at 1967 (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004)). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
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continue to be judicially enforced.  Further, some signs indicate that 
the Roberts Court may be willing to limit Congress’s spending power 
by the Tenth Amendment.  Such a change would alter not only the 
structure and substance of cooperative federalism as it was approved 
by the Court in New York, it could also fundamentally alter dozens of 
federal spending programs. 
In the Medicaid context, states’ rights are often raised as a protest 
against expansions of federal requirements and defined in terms of 
the value of the “laboratory of the states,” which Justice O’Connor ex-
tolled in Gregory.157  On the other hand, Medicaid has been described 
by the Court as a system of cooperative federalism,158 as have the wel-
fare programs upon which Medicaid was built.159  Thus, the clash of 
dual sovereignty against cooperative federalism can be witnessed in 
the Medicaid program, which is now the subject of major litigation 
due to the expansion effectuated by PPACA. 
 
157 Justice O’Connor also covered this ground in her concurrence/dissent in FERC, where 
she wrote:   
Courts and commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as 
laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas.  
This state innovation is no judicial myth. . . . [Federal law], which commands state 
agencies to spend their time evaluating federally proposed standards and defend-
ing their decisions to adopt or reject those standards, will retard this creative expe-
rimentation. 
  FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788–89 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  Justice O’Connor also ex-
plained the merits of cooperative federalism in this opinion.  Id. at 783. 
158 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980).  The Court described Medicaid thusly: 
The Medicaid program created by Title XIX is a cooperative endeavor in which 
the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid 
them in furnishing health care to needy persons.  Under this system of “coopera-
tive federalism,” if a State agrees to establish a Medicaid plan that satisfies the re-
quirements of Title XIX . . . the Federal Government agrees to pay a specified per-
centage of “the total amount expended as medical assistance under the State 
plan.”  The cornerstone of Medicaid is financial contribution by both the Federal 
Government and the participating State. . . . [T]he purpose of Congress in enact-
ing Title XIX was to provide federal financial assistance for all legitimate state ex-
penditures under an approved Medicaid plan. 
  Id. (citations omitted). 
159 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).  The Court wrote: 
The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism.  It is financed 
largely by the Federal Government, on a matching fund basis, and is administered 
by the States.  States are not required to participate in the program, but those 
which desire to take advantage of the substantial federal funds available for distri-
bution to needy children are required to submit an AFDC plan for the approval of 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). 
  Id. (citations omitted). 
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B.  Medicaid and Federalism in the PPACA Litigation 
If Congress were to federalize Medicaid, the Spending Clause 
clearly provides the enumerated power to do so, just as it does for 
Medicare.160  But, this is not the hard question.  The bigger issue is 
whether the Tenth Amendment restrictions will be applied to the 
spending power, and the Court now has a vehicle to revisit this ques-
tion through Florida’s challenge to PPACA’s constitutionality, Florida 
ex rel. Bondi v. United States Department of Health and Human Services.161  
This litigation is the biggest challenge to the most dramatic change to 
Medicaid since its inception, and yet it is, at heart, purely about eco-
nomics—the philosophical change to Medicaid eligibility has not 
been opposed. 
Many parties are challenging PPACA from a number of constitu-
tional perspectives.  Most of the litigation involves challenges to Sec-
tion 1501, the minimum coverage provision that will facilitate univer-
sal insurance coverage, and the Court has granted certiorari 
regarding the constitutionality of this provision.162  It is clear that 
whatever the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause 
outcome may be,163 no federalism issue exists in the individual 
mandate.  PPACA states that individuals who do not carry insurance 
by 2014 will be assessed a tax for each month they do not carry insur-
ance unless certain exceptions apply.164  This insurance coverage re-
quirement affects the relationship between the federal government 
and individuals, but it does not implicate the states.165  The Court’s 
federalism doctrine, though sometimes claiming to protect individual 
 
160 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
161 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 
2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). 
162 Kaiser Health News keeps a helpful “scoreboard” regarding this litigation.  See Bara Vaida 
& Karl Eisenhower, Scoreboard:  Tracking Health Law Court Challenges, KAISER HEALTH NEWS 
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/March/02/health-
reform-law-court-case-status.aspx.  The ACA Litigation Blog is also quite useful.  See Brad 
Joondeph, ACA LITIGATION BLOG (Sept. 9, 2011, 1:13 PM), http://acalitigationblog.
blogspot.com/. 
163 Professor Hall provides a nice Commerce Clause/Necessary and Proper Clause analysis.  
See Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825 
(2011) (detailing the constitutionality of PPACA’s minimum coverage requirement). 
164 PPACA § 1501 (2010). 
165 Professor Barnett argues that the language “the people” in the Tenth Amendment pro-
tects individuals.  See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People:  Why the Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 627 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680392 (“[T]he text of the Tenth Amendment recognizes 
popular as well as state sovereignty.”).  This argument is quite novel, however, because 
“the people” has only been read to protect the people collectively, not individual rights.  
Id. at 623. 
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liberty by limiting governmental function, is not typically a doctrine 
by which individuals are protected directly.  Admittedly, Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinion in Bond calls this assertion into question, as he repeat-
edly asserted that federalism protects not just governmental sove-
reignty but also the people being governed.166 
As this Article goes to press, the Supreme Court has granted certi-
orari on the petitions that arose out of the Eleventh Circuit litigation 
while holding the remaining petitions that represent the multi-circuit 
split that exists regarding the constitutionality of PPACA.167  The Sixth 
Circuit issued a decision that upheld a facial challenge to the consti-
tutionality of Section 1501, but that litigation does not contain a chal-
lenge to the Medicaid expansion.168  Additionally, the Fourth Circuit 
dismissed a challenge to Section 1501 for lack of standing based upon 
the Anti-Injunction Act, but that case also did not address the Medi-
caid expansion.169  Other circuits have weighed in, but only the Flori-
da-led litigation, in which the Eleventh Circuit declared Section 1501 
unconstitutional but severable, asserts that PPACA exceeds Con-
gress’s power under the Spending Clause by creating coercive condi-
tions on Medicaid funding.170  It seems strange to say “only” given that 
this litigation now involves more than half of the states, yet none of 
the other major challenges to PPACA include this question.171 
The claim that the Medicaid expansion is unconstitutional has 
been sustained as the litigation progresses and is one of the questions 
presented in Florida’s petition for certiorari, providing a vehicle for 
 
166 See Bond v. United States, No. 09–1227, slip op. at 9 (U.S. June 16, 2011) (“Federalism 
secures the freedom of the individual.”). 
167 See Joondeph, supra note 162. 
168 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 545 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the 
PPACA’s minimum coverage provision to be a “valid exercise of legislative power by Con-
gress under the Commerce Clause”). 
169 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
170 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 
2011 WL 285683, at *3–7 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).  The Tenth Amendment challenge 
was not briefed and thus not addressed by the decision, id. at *7 n.5, though notably the 
claim was not dismissed in the initial Motion to Dismiss of October 14, 2010.  See Florida 
ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1156–60 
(N.D. Fla. 2010) (dismissing a handful of the claims in the Florida litigation). 
171 I say major because the Lieutenant Governor of Missouri’s complaint included a charge 
that the Medicaid expansion was, essentially, impermissible commandeering under Printz, 
but the complaint was dismissed for lack of standing.  See Complaint at 26, Kinder v. 
Geithner, No. 1:10 CV 101 RWS (E.D. Mo. July 7, 2010); see also Kinder v. Geithner, No. 
1:10 CV 101 RWS, 18–19 (E.D. Mo., Apr. 26, 2011) (dismissing Count IV).  An appeal was 
heard before the Eighth Circuit on October 20, 2011.  See Elizabeth Stawicki, Minnesota 
Appeals Court Hears Case Challenging Health Law,  KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/October/21/appeals-court-minnesota-
legal-challenge-insurance-mandate.aspx. 
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the Supreme Court to decide longstanding questions regarding limits 
on the power to spend.172  At the district court level, Florida basically 
argued that the Medicaid expansion would cost too much and be too 
different from Medicaid pre-PPACA but that the states could not 
leave the amended program because they rely too heavily on it finan-
cially.  Thus, according to Florida, the law constitutes impermissible 
coercion under the test for conditions on spending articulated in 
South Dakota v. Dole.173  The coercion theory was issued as the fifth, 
unenumerated element of the conditional spending test in Dole, 
which stated that the federal government may place conditions on its 
spending so long as:  the spending is for the general welfare; any 
conditions on the spending are clear and unambiguous; the condi-
tions are germane to the purpose for which the government is spend-
ing; and the conditions are not themselves unconstitutional.174  Final-
ly, the Court stated:  “Our decisions have recognized that in some 
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might 
be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into com-
pulsion.’”175  The Supreme Court has not broached the coercion idea 
in subsequent spending cases, and the theory largely has been unsuc-
cessful in lower federal courts.176 
The states urged only that the coercion element is violated; they 
did not allege infringement of the other four elements of the Dole 
test.177  Heretofore, the clear statement rule (the second element, 
demanding that conditions on funds be unambiguous) has been the 
most widely litigated and successful challenge to federal spending, 
but the coercion theory has been part of spending and federalism 
case law since 1937.178 
 
172 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 1–2, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 11-398 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2011) (urging the Court to determine whether the fifth Dole 
element—coercion—applies to the Medicaid expansion or is effectively “no longer 
appl[icable]”). 
173 Bondi, 2011 WL 285683 at *3. 
174 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).  The second element of this test was 
modified by Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).  See 
Huberfeld, Clear Notice, supra note 146, at 445–46, 469–72 (tracing and explaining the 
evolution of the clear notice standard in Arlington). 
175 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
176 See, e.g., Response/Reply Brief for Appellants at 51–52, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (summarizing the sta-
tus of the coercion theory in lower federal courts). 
177 Bondi, 2011 WL 285683 at *3.  The states added a more complete analysis of the Dole test 
late in the litigation, but Judge Vinson rejected their cursory analysis.  Id. 
178 See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591–92 (1937) (finding that Title IX of 
the Social Security Act of 1935 was not coercive, and thus not invalid). 
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Judge Vinson’s opinion at the district court level rejected the 
coercion claim.179  Judge Vinson noted that the state plaintiffs as-
serted that they were forced to spend huge amounts of money in the 
Medicaid program but that they “effectively have no choice other 
than to participate in the program.”180  But, as the judge noted, other 
non-litigant states, as well as the defendants, claimed the Medicaid 
expansion would save states’ money in the long run.181  The judge 
found the factual issues to be too prominent for summary judgment, 
but then, paradoxically, he ruled as a matter of law that the coercion 
claim should be dismissed.182  Judge Vinson explored other federal 
courts’ treatment of coercion and concluded that coercion is a non-
justiciable issue, presumably as a political question, though it was not 
specifically stated.183 
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of the 
Medicaid claim.184  In a relatively small portion of the 200-plus page 
opinion, Judges Dubina and Hull noted that Florida had refined its 
arguments at the appellate level, claiming that it was not just the size 
of the federal funding but also the nature of the condition attached 
to the federal funding that could constitute coercion.185  The judges 
phlegmatically traced the roots of the coercion theory and found it to 
be justiciable, despite the difficulty of finding a judicial standard for 
coercion.186 
An intriguing aspect of this history and exploration was the 
judges’ conclusion that Dole must mean that the Tenth Amendment 
limits the spending power.  The court wrote: 
[W]e find it a reasonable conclusion that Dole instructs that the Tenth 
Amendment places certain limitations on congressional spending; name-
ly, that Congress cannot place restrictions so burdensome and threaten 
the loss of funds so great and important to the state’s integral function as 
a state—funds that the state has come to rely on heavily as part of its eve-
ryday service to its citizens—as to compel the state to participate in the 
 
179 Bondi, 2011 WL 285683 at *5–6.  This was a bit surprising, given that Judge Vinson 
seemed to be a sympathetic ear (he held the individual mandate to be an unconstitution-
al exercise of Commerce Clause authority and a federalism problem).  Id. at *33. 
180 Id. at *4. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at *4–5. 
184 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067, slip op. at 206 
(11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011). 
185 Id. at 56 n.63.  See Opening/Response Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant States at 51–52 
Florida, Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (arguing that post-Dole decisions “correctly recognize 
that the coercion doctrine focuses on both the size of the federal inducement and the re-
lationship between the condition and the inducement”). 
186 Florida, Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067, slip op. at 60–63. 
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“optional” legislation.  This is the point where “pressure turns into com-
pulsion.”187 
This passage is notable given that the Court in Dole specifically stated 
that the Tenth Amendment does not limit the power to spend,188 and 
New York reiterated the analysis only five years after Dole.189  On the 
other hand, if coercion has any meaning, it must be that it is a prob-
lem of dual sovereignty, which is rooted in the Tenth Amendment.190 
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the grant of summary 
judgment regarding the Medicaid expansion not because the theory 
of coercion is non-justiciable but because the court concluded that 
coercion is not present.191  The court presented four reasons for this 
conclusion, namely, that the states knew upon entering Medicaid that 
the federal government could alter the program at will; the federal 
government bears the vast majority of the costs of the Medicaid ex-
pansion; states have years of notice and therefore have time to drop 
out or raise more money as they need; and states that are noncom-
pliant may only be penalized rather than dropped from Medicaid to-
tally.192 
The coercion issue will now be heard by the Supreme Court.  The 
petition for certiorari filed by Florida and the other states in the Ele-
 
187 Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
188 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987).  The Court wrote:  “We have also held 
that a perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs 
did not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal 
grants.”  Id. (referring to Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1947)). 
189 New York v United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173 (1992) (“The Act’s first set of incentives, in 
which Congress has conditioned grants to the States upon the States’ attainment of a se-
ries of milestones, is thus well within the authority of Congress under the Commerce and 
Spending Clauses.  Because the first set of incentives is supported by affirmative constitu-
tional grants of power to Congress, it is not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment.”). 
190 If coercion is a problem of dual sovereignty, it seems the Court’s decisions indicate one of 
two things:  Either it is not proper for Congress to make an offer because the offer is not 
a suitable exercise of federal power and thus inherently infringes states’ autonomy, see 
Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending:  Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 
SUP. CT. REV. 85, 97, 102–03 (1988) (noting that the test in National League of Cities was 
unworkable and should be replaced by the question of “whether the enactment was a 
proper subject of federal regulation”), or Congress has constitutional authority, but state 
compliance is a foregone conclusion because the state will lose too much if it rejects the 
federal offer.  The Dole test, which looks for excessive financial inducement, implies that 
the latter is correct.  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (explaining that depending on its severity, a 
financial inducement can become compulsive). 
191 Florida., Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067, slip op. at 63–64.  This seems like a factual analysis, 
not a decision as a matter of law, but Judge Marcus concurred in this conclusion.  Id. at 
208 (Marcus, J., concurring and dissenting) (dissenting regarding the constitutionality of 
the minimum coverage provision but concurring in standing, constitutionality of the Me-
dicaid expansion, and taxing power). 
192 Id. at 64–67. 
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venth Circuit places the Medicaid expansion issue as the first ques-
tion presented in their petition.  Specifically, they have asked the 
Court to determine whether Congress  
exceed[s] its enumerated powers and violate[s] basic principles of fede-
ralism when it coerces States into accepting onerous conditions that it 
could not impose directly by threatening to withhold all federal funding 
under the single largest grant-in-aid program, or does the limitation on 
Congress’s spending power . . . in Dole . . . no longer apply?193 
Thus, the states are directly posing the question that prior deci-
sions have only hinted at:  is the Tenth Amendment a limit on Con-
gress’s spending power, or is it not?  If it is, then innumerable spend-
ing programs will be affected.  If not, then the fifth unenumerated 
element from Dole should be explicitly overruled.  Given the few hints 
the Roberts Court has provided regarding its interpretation of the 
Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment as a protector of fede-
ralism, it is possible this Court would read the Tenth Amendment to 
be a judicially enforceable limit on spending. 
States demonstrated long ago they could not support impove-
rished patients or the healthcare providers who treat them without 
significant federal assistance; this is the reason we have a Medicaid 
program but also part of the reason states claim they cannot leave the 
program.  States argue that the problem with Medicaid expansion is 
that they have become locked in to the program and cannot reject 
any new conditions on the federal spending.194  An aspect of their 
complaint is that states are locked in politically, as few politicians 
would have the courage to drop federal Medicaid dollars and face the 
wrath of healthcare providers (the voices of the poor are not nearly as 
loud, though they too would protest).  The states are also locked in 
monetarily because the federal match makes it very hard for states to 
cut Medicaid dollars without losing substantially more than the actual 
dollar amount cut from their budget.195  If a state has a 50% match, 
then that state loses one federal dollar for every dollar it cuts from its 
 
193 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 172, at i. 
194 See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 133 (“Once adopted, a cooperative federalism 
program such as Medicaid has a political ‘lock-in’ effect—the matching formula that 
makes program enhancements so appealing also makes cutbacks very unappealing.”); see 
also David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst:  A Function-
al Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1197, 1242–44 (2004) (expressing concern about lock-in and proposing that clear state-
ment rules could prevent administrative attempts to ratchet-up federal requirements in 
spending programs). 
195 See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 142 (describing the disproportionately large loss 
of federal funding for every dollar of reduction in state contributions to Medicaid). 
470 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:2 
 
budget, for a net cut of two dollars.196  If a state has a 75% match, 
then that state loses three federal dollars for every dollar it cuts, mak-
ing it much harder for poorer states to trim their Medicaid programs 
because the total loss is four dollars for a one dollar budget cut.197  It 
is on this basis that states claim to be “coerced” in the Medicaid pro-
gram.  Legal scholars have puzzled through the idea of coercion in 
federal spending programs and have questioned whether coercion 
should be justiciable, but no one theory has predominated.198  While 
coercion may be one way to describe the situation, it seems like the 
states suffer from their own path dependence in Medicaid (“we desire 
to be partners and to have more autonomy because we have always 
asked for these things”). 
On the face of it, the Dole test indicates that this kind of financial 
pressure would be impermissible coercion.  It is not problematic for 
the federal government to spend for the general welfare through 
Medicaid; the condition is perfectly clear; it is germane to the pur-
pose of increasing medical access for the poor; and it is not based on 
unconstitutional conditions (unless the Court were to start using the 
Tenth Amendment to limit the spending power).  Unlike South Da-
kota (which would have lost 5% of federal funds), states could lose all 
Medicaid funding if they rejected the expansion, which they could 
not do without major financial repercussions reverberating through 
the healthcare systems in the state.199  While the states’ second largest 
 
196 In 2010, thirty-five states had an FMAP between 50% and 75%.  Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Found., Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for Medicaid and Multiplier, 
STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG,  http://statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=184&
cat=4&sub=47&yr=1&typ=2 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
197 Fifteen states and the District of Columbia had an FMAP above 75% in 2010.  Id.  Al-
though 75% is typically the upper limit, special funding for the states has brought the 
FMAP as high as nearly 85% in the Great Recession years.  See supra notes 77–81 and ac-
companying text. 
198 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole:  Why the Court Should 
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 
IND. L.J. 459, 517–20 (2003) (criticizing the coercion theory of unconstitutionality as too 
difficult for courts to enforce because it is unclear how a constitutional doctrine should 
differ from common law concepts of coercion); cf. McCoy & Friedman, supra note 190, at 
118–19 (explaining that Dole mischaracterized the coercion test for congressional spend-
ing, which, properly understood, should be an inquiry into whether the federal govern-
ment is using the taxing or spending power to create a result that Congress could not 
command directly). 
199 See Huberfeld, Clear Notice, supra note 146, at 488 (noting that foregoing federal Medicaid 
funds would be “an unsatisfactory response given how many citizens rely on Medicaid and 
how long states have relied on federal spending to provide health insurance and services 
to the poor”). 
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budgetary commitment is Medicaid,200 states would say they do not 
choose to make Medicaid a commitment of that size.201 
On the other hand, the Medicaid expansion is primarily funded 
by the federal government.  Some states claim the PPACA expansion 
will actually save them money because it will help to alleviate other 
burdens such as uncompensated care in hospitals.202  These states do 
not feel coerced, they feel assisted.  The factual differences of opi-
nion make summary judgment inappropriate for resolving the issue.  
They also make it possible for the Court to decide a smaller ques-
tion—the constitutionality of this Medicaid expansion provision un-
der existing doctrine—rather than the larger issue of federalism as it 
relates to the spending power. 
Even if the states were successful in their coercion argument, the 
end result is not obvious.  The states do not automatically win by de-
volution; New York tells us that the federal government can take over 
the program completely, which would actually be a win for the states 
monetarily (and for Medicaid enrollees who are not subject to the 
economic vagaries of the states).203  This seems to be where dual sove-
reignty and cooperative federalism collide in Medicaid. 
The question is why the states continue to jointly operate Medica-
id.  After all, the states have demanded at times that Medicaid be-
come a federalized program, but that is not the current trend; in-
 
200 See Donald J. Boyd, Health Care Within the Larger State Budget, in FEDERALISM AND HEALTH 
POLICY, supra note 14, at 59, 59–60 (“[S]tate governments spend more of their own funds 
on health care than on any other function except elementary and secondary educa-
tion.”). 
201 A recent article quoted Governor Barbour of Mississippi as stating, “‘We shouldn’t have to 
kowtow and kiss the ring’ to make changes that will work for Mississippi residents.”  Mary 
Agnes Carey, Miss. Gov. Barbour: ‘We Shouldn’t Have To Kowtow’ to Feds on Medicaid Rules, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/
March/01/barbour-block-grants-medicaid-short-take.aspx.  Ironically, Mississippi has the 
highest federal match for Medicaid in the country at 85%, id., which means the state 
spends the least and has the most to lose. 
202 See Brief of the States of Oregon et al. at 18–19, as Amici Curiae in Support of Defen-
dants-Appellants, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-91 RV/EMT) (explaining the cost savings to 
be found in universal insurance coverage); Brief of Amici Curiae State Legislators in 
Support of Defendants-Appellants at 25–34, McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (No. 3:10-cv-
91 RV/EMT) (describing the financial benefits of PPACA to the states). 
203 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (explaining that if a state does not 
wish to submit to a regulatory program of federal and state cooperation, the federal gov-
ernment can bear the full burden of regulating that area); see also Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 304–05 (1981) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of a surface mining regulatory regime promulgated by Congress to be 
enforced by participating states or by the Secretary of the Interior and the federal gov-
ernment in non-participating states). 
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stead, many state governors would have the federal government pro-
vide more money with fewer controls in the form of “block grants” as 
an answer to their coercion complaints.  Professors Feeley and Rubin 
have asserted that “states’ rights” is a cipher for disagreement with 
federal policy but not a true rationale for federalism.204  This interpre-
tation applies well to the Medicaid context.  Becoming a block grant 
program could relieve the states of some federal oversight and thus 
provide them with some ability to “experiment,” but the history of 
Medicaid tells many tales of state inability to manage and pay for wel-
fare medicine.205  The states agreed to participate in Medicaid be-
cause they were eager for federal assistance.  When the states have 
had room to “experiment,” they have often hewed to old-fashioned 
notions of the deserving poor to keep enrollment down, gamed the 
federal reimbursement system,206 and cut assistance whenever budgets 
are tight.  In a severe economic downturn, the states need to trim 
their budgets for lack of tax revenue, but they have mandatory Medi-
caid enrollees swelling the budget at the same time, which generally 
leads the states to ask for additional federal funds.207  The states are 
entitled to the matching federal funds that the Medicaid Act promis-
es if they comply with the terms of the law, but they are not entitled 
to higher federal funding with no responsibilities. 
Surely this is not the experiment of the states that the Court (or 
anyone else) envisioned—state deviation based on budgetary short-
falls.208  This kind of variation is neither normatively useful nor posi-
 
204 See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 16, at 74.  Medicaid has shown itself to be an example 
of this kind of federalism:  it is a program that could be decentralized, but that does not 
require geographic sub-units empowered to make independent policy decisions. 
205 A modern example of welfare medicine, CHIP, shows that the states would be likely to 
overspend block grants significantly.  See Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, A 
Decade of SCHIP Experience and Issues for Reauthorization, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. 2–3 (Jan. 2007), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7574.pdf (explaining 
that despite state efforts to increase coverage, fiscal pressures and documentation re-
quirements undermined that goal, necessitating an increase in federal funding for 
CHIP’s continued viability).  CHIP was renewed with expanded federal funding because 
the states could not manage their CHIP budgets well.  See Children’s Health Insurance 
Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8. 
206 Teresa A. Coughlin & Stephen Zuckerman, States’ Strategies for Tapping Federal Revenues:  
Implications and Consequences of Medicaid Maximization, in FEDERALISM AND HEALTH POLICY, 
supra note 14, at 145, 145 (describing policies developed by states to achieve a maximum 
return in federal funding for a minimum investment of state funds to finance Medicaid). 
207 See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (extended by Pub. L. No. 111-226, 124 Stat. 2389 (2010)) (making supplemental ap-
propriations for areas including state Medicaid funding). 
208 See Henry Aaron, Health Reform and Federalism:  Henry Aaron’s View, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(Mar. 11, 2011, 10:25 AM),  http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/03/11/health-reform-
and-federalism-henry-aarons-view (noting that, at the beginning of the recession in the 
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tive for the program, as it leads to wild fluctuations in access to and 
quality of care for Medicaid enrollees.209  State experimentation has 
resulted in some success in terms of such challenges as incorporating 
managed care into Medicaid to cover more enrollees, but it seems 
more and more that states seek to experiment so they can cut services 
or enrollment.  This has no value for Medicaid enrollees, who seem 
to have gotten lost in the federal-state ideological battle over Medica-
id. 
IV.  CHOOSING A DIFFERENT PATH—FEDERALIZE MEDICAID 
COMPLETELY 
PPACA federalized Medicaid from both a philosophical and an 
economic perspective.  Fully federalizing Medicaid would halt the 
contentious debate about states’ rights in a national healthcare pro-
gram.  Federalization would create a more coherent, consistent, and 
equal program for the poor, who often experience uneven, substan-
dard care by overworked and underpaid healthcare providers.  
Moreover, in many ways, Medicaid is largely already federalized con-
sidering the level of federal spending for all healthcare and the ways 
in which medical standards have steadily been nationalized.  This part 
explores some reasons that federalizing Medicaid would be an im-
provement over the current structure, first by noting the ways in 
which Medicaid is already federalized, then by describing why federa-
lization would be beneficial. 
A.  Steps Already Taken 
1.  Federal Funding 
Most of the cost of Medicaid already is paid by the federal gov-
ernment, despite the cooperative federalism status of the program.  
The federal match varies from 50% to 75%, with an average of about 
57%.210  These percentages do not include the supermatch for 
 
early 2000s, the states immediately stopped their experiments in health reform and 
started asking the federal government for funding). 
209 See John Holahan, Variation in Health Insurance Coverage and Medical Expenditures:  How 
Much Is Too Much?, in FEDERALISM AND HEALTH POLICY, supra note 14, at 111, 136 (“[T]he 
existing federal-state financing structure has left the United States with serious inequities 
in regard to health care.”). 
210 See EVELYNE P. BAUMRUCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32950, MEDICAID:  THE FEDERAL 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE (FMAP) 13–14 (2010) (listing the federal medical assis-
tance percentages for each state in fiscal year 2011).  This percentage will be higher when 
the Medicaid expansion is complete.  See id. at 11. 
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PPACA’s new Medicaid enrollees or such special state fiscal relief as 
that provided in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (ARRA),211 which increased the FMAP for all states from a low of 
about 62% in thirteen states to a high of almost 85% for Mississippi.212  
In addition to matching the states’ expenditures for medical services, 
the federal government pays more than 50% of state administrative 
costs for Medicaid, as was described above.213 
Looking beyond Medicaid, the federal government currently pays 
for a substantial portion of the healthcare costs in the United 
States.214  The indicators of the federal government’s share of health-
care expenditures vary depending on the factors one considers, but 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) conveys 
measurements each year that are useful.  CMS reports that national 
healthcare expenditures (“NHE”) currently account for about 18% of 
the nation’s gross domestic product.215  While this percentage does 
not correlate directly to the federal government’s payments for 
healthcare, it suggests the national status of the “medical industrial 
complex.”216  In direct payments for healthcare, federal dollars ac-
count for about 34% of NHE.217  This accounts for Medicare, Medica-
 
211 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
212 BAUMRUCKER, supra note 210, at 15–16 (charting the increased federal medical assistance 
percentages for states as a result of ARRA in fiscal year 2009); see also Henry J. Kaiser Fam-
ily Found., Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for Medicaid with American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) Adjustments, FY2010, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=695&cat=4&sub=154&yr=133&typ
=2 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (listing the post-ARRA federal medical assistance percen-
tages for the states). 
213 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; see also APRIL GRADY, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS 22101, STATE MEDICAID PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION:  A BRIEF OVERVIEW 2 (2008) 
(noting that the administrative match does not vary like the FMAP, and remains 50% with 
some exceptions for certain state activities that receive designated higher federal fund-
ing). 
214 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs:  The Need for National Action in Medical 
Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 861–62 (2009) (explaining that, in addition 
to Medicaid, the federal government also contributes to payment for medical care in the 
United States through Medicare, CHIP, and targeted tax breaks, amounting in sum to 
about 40% of total national health expenditures). 
215 NHE Fact Sheet, National Health Expenditure Data, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/25_NHE_Fact_Sheet.asp 
(last updated June 14, 2011). 
216 See Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963, 963 
(1980) (exploring the development of what the author calls the “new medical-industrial 
complex,” an industry providing health-care services for profit, including the rise of pro-
prietary hospitals and diagnostic laboratories, comprised of manufacturers of pharma-
ceuticals and medical equipment). 
217 See NHE Fact Sheet, supra note 215 (“The federal government share of health care spend-
ing increased just over three percentage points in 2009 to 27 percent, while the shares of 
Dec. 2011] FEDERALIZING MEDICAID 475 
 
id, CHIP, and military healthcare programs, but not the Federal Em-
ployees Health Benefits (“FEHB”) program.218  FEHB appears to add 
about $28 billion to the health expense tally.219 
Interestingly, the CMS numbers also show that the administrative 
cost of Medicaid ($18.2 billion) is much higher than the administra-
tive cost of Medicare ($7 billion).220  Though CMS does not explain 
the disparity, at least one reason is apparent.  The federal govern-
ment’s payment for states’ administrative costs in addition to admi-
nistering Medicaid at the federal level creates a double executive 
structure that is inherently inefficient.  The higher federal matching 
for utilization review, immigration documentation checks, MFCUs, 
and other items creates additional double expenses.221  The issue of 
administrative costs will be discussed further below. 
The CMS report on NHE does not report other kinds of federal 
healthcare expenditures.  Indirect payments would include such costs 
as the tax subsidies that incentivize employers to provide health in-
surance as an employment benefit.  The 2010 estimate of lost income 
taxes from individuals’ exemption for employers’ contributions to 
health insurance is reported to account for about $105.7 billion.222  
When added to direct expenditures, this brings the federal govern-
ment’s share of NHE to almost 40%.  And numerous such subsidies 
exist, such as the tax-exempt status of hospitals and the resulting tax-
free bonds they can procure for development, which accounted for 
 
spending by households (28 percent), private businesses (21 percent) and state and local 
government (16 percent) fell by about 1 percentage point each.”);  Medicare, Medicaid, 
CHIP, Department of Defense, and Department of Veterans’ Affairs expenditures totaled 
$839.3 billion in 2009.  Table 3:  National Health Expenditures, Levels and Average Annual 
Growth from Previous Year Shown by Source of Funds, Selected Calendar Years 1960–2009, 
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, available at https://www.cms.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf.  This is about 34% of NHE, which 
was about $2.4 trillion total.  Id. 
218 Id. 
219 OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION:  PERFORMANCE BUDGET 
21 (2010) (estimating that in FY 2010, the federal government would contribute about 
70% of premium costs in FEHB, about $28 billion).  When FEHB is added to the sum of 
federal contributions to healthcare, the federal government pays about 36% of NHE. 
220 Table 4:  National Health Expenditures, by Source of Funds and Type of Expenditure:  Calendary 
Years 2003–2009, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, available at 
https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf. 
221 See GRADY, supra note 213, at 2–3 (listing various administrative functions with federal 
matches higher than 50%). 
222 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 
2010–2014, at 47 (2011), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=
startdown&id=3717 (charting the calculated magnitude of the exclusion from income tax 
of employer contributions for health care, health insurance premiums, and long-term 
care insurance premiums). 
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about $500 million dollars in 2010.223  The list of such exclusions, de-
ductions, and other special tax treatments is reported every four years 
to the House of Representatives, and it is considerable.224  In 2002, 
Woolander and Himmelstein estimated that the federally financed 
share of health spending was 40%; they reached this number by ac-
counting for the indirect spending through tax redistribution (such 
as that detailed in this paragraph), which they described as “tax fi-
nanced” health spending.225  This percentage would likely be higher 
today due to increased use of such tax-free vehicles as flexible spend-
ing accounts. 
The numbers show that the federal government is already respon-
sible for a large portion of health spending.  Though the states were 
once the locus of medical regulatory and financial activity, that is no 
longer the case.  The federal government and the states each play 
roles in American healthcare, but the federal role grows by the year.  
Medicaid seems to be an area where the states cling to their historic 
welfare medicine role, yet they have not been able to afford that task 
for decades upon decades. 
2.  Medical Standards 
The practice of medicine is increasingly nationalized, but Medica-
id enrollees live in a world subject to local rules by virtue of variations 
in state policy.226  Medicaid should reflect the ever more national na-
ture of the practice of medicine, which can be seen through a few ex-
amples of the move from local practice standards to national stan-
dards of care.227 
First, people who obtain a medical doctor degree and who want to 
practice medicine in this country must pass the U.S. Medical Licens-
 
223 Id. at 48. 
224 See id. at 47–49 (providing data on various health-related exclusions, deductions, and oth-
er special tax treatments). 
225 Steffie Woolhander & David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National Health Insurance-–And Not 
Getting It, 21 HEALTH AFF. 88, 91–92 (2002) (noting that if state and local tax-financed 
health spending are included, the government pays for 59.8% of healthcare expendi-
tures, which counters the public perception that our healthcare system is private in na-
ture). 
226 See Holahan, supra note 209, at 136 (“[T]he existing federal-state financing structure has 
left the United States with serious inequities in regard to health care.”). 
227 See generally Moncrieff, supra note 214 (arguing for federal malpractice reform proposals 
to address the increasing extent to which the federal government shoulders malpractice 
policy costs externalized by the states). 
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ing Examination (“USMLE”).228  This standardized exam is adminis-
tered by the National Board of Medical Examiners, a body comprised 
of physicians from across the country, and the exam is created and 
graded by a nation-wide body of physicians.229  Every state requires the 
USMLE as a condition of licensure, and states may vary in other li-
censure requirements,230 but the USMLE reflects the idea that medi-
cine has become a science with uniform, national standards.231  In ad-
dition to the USMLE, consider the ease with which doctors trained in 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, or Maryland will practice in Kansas, 
Montana, or California.  Doctors are not trained within a state to 
practice only within that state’s borders.  Granted, many doctors prac-
tice medicine within only one state, but even that is changing with 
the rise of telemedicine as a method to reach medically underserved 
areas and to spread the expertise of certain specialists.232 
Second, national medical standards have been recognized in med-
ical malpractice litigation.  This is not a perfect proxy for the nationa-
lization of medical treatment, but it is a serviceable microcosm that 
has existed for decades.  For the first part of the 1900’s, medical lia-
bility litigation relied on local medical standards, as physicians argued 
that the practice of medicine was an art as well as a science that varied 
by physician, by local practice standards, and by resources.  Medical 
 
228 See About USMLE, U.S. MED. LICENSING EXAMINATION, http://www.usmle.org/about/ (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2011) (explaining how the USMLE acts as a common evaluation system 
for applicants to the state medical boards by assessing “a physician’s ability to apply know-
ledge, concepts, and principles, and to demonstrate fundamental patient-centered skills, 
that are important in health and disease and that constitute the basis of safe and effective 
patient care”). 
229 See 2011 USMLE Bulletin—Overview, UNITED STATES MED. LICENSING EXAMINATION, 
http://www.usmle.org/bulletin/overview (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (providing general 
background information on the USMLE, its purposes, and its development). 
230 Medical Licensure, Becoming a Physician, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/
pub/education-careers/becoming-physician/medical-licensure.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011) (noting that, despite some variation in state licensing requirements, all states re-
quire proof of successfully completing all stages of the USMLE, or its equivalent for indi-
viduals licensed before the USMLE was implemented in 1994).  One could argue that 
state licensure requirements and oversight of state medical boards militate toward state 
dominance of the practice of medicine, but the historic role of the states seems to be di-
minishing in light of such trends as nationalized standards. 
231 This is unlike the case for lawyers, though the legal profession is trying to nationalize its 
licensing process through a Uniform Bar Examination.  See, e.g., Uniform Bar Examination:  
Jurisdiction News, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.ncbex.org/single-news-item/article/58/27/ (listing uniform bar examina-
tion jurisdictions). 
232 See, e.g., Heather L. Daly, Telemedicine:  The Invisible Legal Barriers to the Health Care of the 
Future, 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 73, 79–80 (2000) (describing the benefits of telemedicine, 
including increased ability to reach remote areas and wider access to medical specialists). 
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malpractice standards were governed by “locality” rules until about 
1967, when courts started to recognize that doctors were held to na-
tional practice standards with variation for resources and hardships 
imposed by locale.233  Granted, the locality rule is more about testify-
ing in medical malpractice cases than it is about actually setting na-
tional standards, and tort law is state law, but it also speaks to the es-
sentially uniform training that physicians receive and the 
nationalization of standards of care through medical education and 
certification processes. 
Third, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(“EMTALA”) has strengthened the trend toward understanding the 
practice of medicine as national in scope rather than a local, varied 
“art.”234  EMTALA requires hospitals that have emergency depart-
ments and that accept Medicare as reimbursement for their services 
to screen and stabilize every patient who presents an emergency med-
ical condition regardless of the person’s ability to pay.235  Patients who 
believe that EMTALA has been violated in their treatment (or lack 
thereof) can sue the hospital that allegedly wronged them in federal 
court.  This litigation has produced a consensus that screening is suf-
ficient so long as the hospital follows its own screening procedures, 
but treatment is subject to national standards of care.236  EMTALA too 
points toward recognition that patients should receive a certain scien-
tific, nationally recognized standard of care.237 
Why, then, is it acceptable for poor patients to receive highly va-
ried forms of care in different states depending on that state’s Medi-
caid policy?  Patients who are able to pay for their care would not to-
 
233 See, e.g., Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973, 977–98 (Wash. 1967) (rejecting the locali-
ty rule for malpractice liability in favor of a rule defining the standard of care as that ex-
pected of the average practitioner in the relevant field, acting in the same or similar cir-
cumstances). 
234 See Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd 
(2006) (describing national requirements for examination and treatment of emergency 
medical conditions). 
235 Id.; see also EMTALA Overview, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
http://www.cms.gov/EMTALA/ (last updated June 15, 2011) (giving an overview of the 
requirements imposed by EMTALA on Medicare-participating hospitals that offer emer-
gency services). 
236 See, e.g., Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (listing vari-
ous other jurisdictions agreeing with the court’s conclusion that screening should com-
port with the screening that hospital would have given to any patient, whether private 
pay, public pay, or indigent). 
237 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (“[T]he hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening 
examination within the capability of the hospital’s emergency department, including an-
cillary services routinely available to the emergency department . . . .”). 
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lerate being subject to state ‘experimentation’ with their medicine;238 
it seems absurd that patients should be subjects of the laboratory of 
the states because of their poverty.  This variation speaks volumes 
about the devalued status of the health of the poor.  One of the ar-
guments for keeping states in the Medicaid program is that studies 
show medical practices vary across the country.  But, importantly, 
these studies do not show that practices vary by state, just that varia-
tions exist.239  The assumption that the states are an effective organiza-
tional principle for delivery of healthcare is too simple; after all, a di-
abetic’s need for a kidney transplant does not change when she 
crosses the line between Arizona and New Mexico, but only one state 
covers the procedure in its Medicaid program. 
B.  Reasons to Forge a New Path 
Medicaid has long been the second largest portion of state budg-
ets (education is first).240  States often expand Medicaid when the 
economy is strong, adding benefits, adding categories of eligible 
enrollees, adding to existing benefits, and advertising the availability 
of Medicaid coverage.241  But when recessions hit, states struggle to 
fund their Medicaid programs at the very moment that the enroll-
ment swells due to job losses.242  When hard times hit, states then at-
tempt to remove the expansion populations from their Medicaid 
rolls, which is part of the reason PPACA contained a “maintenance of 
 
238 Some exceptions may exist—for instance, surrogacy laws, medical marijuana, and physi-
cian assisted death—but these are not elements of basic care that are subject to varying 
state policy.  Interestingly, these state-based variations appear to benefit wealthier patients 
who can obtain access to both the exotic medical care and the lobbyists needed to create 
special state laws. 
239 See Marilyn Moon, Making Medicaid a National Program:  Medicare as a Model, in FEDERALISM 
AND HEALTH POLICY, supra note 14, at 325, 332–34 (arguing that variation in states’ re-
spective Medicaid programs is in part a result of their willingness or hesitance to experi-
ment with innovation). 
240 Boyd, supra note 200, at 59 (“[S]tate governments spend more of their own funds on 
health care than any other function except elementary and secondary education; when 
federal funding is included, states spend more on health care than on any other function, 
including education.”). 
241 See id. at 60 (explaining that fiscal windfalls during the 1990s allowed states to easily fund 
Medicaid and other health care programs). 
242 See generally Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Key Questions About Medicaid 
and Its Role in State/Federal Budgets and Health Reform, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
2–3 (Jan. 2011), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8139.pdf (“Medicaid costs are 
driven largely by increases in enrollment. . . . This is especially true during economic 
downturns, when unemployment rises and incomes fall, increasing the number of low-
income people eligible for Medicaid.”). 
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effort” provision.243  So, states often seek additional funding from the 
federal government, and without these additional funds, many states 
would be unable to pay for their Medicaid programs.244 
States seem to be aware of this economic quagmire and to resent 
it.  On the one hand, they ask for additional funding for Medicaid, 
knowing that the program is necessary.  On the other hand, they ask 
for more freedom in Medicaid, understanding that more federal 
funding generally leads to greater federal control of the program.  
This schizophrenic behavior is on display in the briefs states have 
submitted in their challenges to PPACA.  Some states argue that the 
PPACA expansion of Medicaid is indispensible to cut their costs for 
the uninsured in the healthcare system.  Others argue that PPACA is 
coercive under the Dole test because it is too expensive, even though 
the federal government totally funds the enrollment increase initially 
and then provides a supermatch.245 
Federalizing Medicaid would end the economic fluctuations that 
have a direct effect on Medicaid enrollees’ health.  Enrollees rely on 
the Medicaid program for access to healthcare more than others in 
the population due to their poverty.246  If a state cuts its Medicaid 
budget and chooses not to cover certain services in the pursuit of 
maintaining fiscal integrity, Medicaid patients do not receive needed 
care.  For example, Arizona made national headlines when it cut 
transplant services from its Medicaid program late in 2010, a decision 
that was clearly fiscal (it also cut basic services such as annual physi-
cals).247  It appears that at least one Medicaid enrollee has now died 
due to this change in the Arizona program.248  Other states have re-
sponded to the recession by cutting provider payments, which are al-
ready quite low, and by cutting prescription drugs and other “option-
 
243 PPACA § 2001(b). 
244 The renewal of the ARRA funding for Medicaid is a microcosm of this phenomenon. 
245 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Florida ex 
rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. Jan. 
31, 2011), 2011 WL 285683 (arguing that the PPACA is unlawfully coercive of the states 
under Dole and imposes “billions of dollars of unaffordable new costs”). 
246 See Finkelstein et al., supra note 7, at 29 (finding that low-income individuals afforded 
health care coverage through the Oregon state health care lottery program reaped bene-
fits not experienced by their uninsured counterparts). 
247 See Kevin Sack, Arizona Medicaid Cuts Seen as a Sign of the Times, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05transplant.html?ref=arizona (“The cuts in 
transplant coverage . . . are testament to both the severity of fiscal pressures on the states 
and the particular bloodlessness of budget-cutting in Arizona.”). 
248 Mary K. Reinhart, 2nd Person Denied Arizona Transplant Coverage Dies, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 
5, 2011, http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/01/05/20110105arizona-second-
patient-denied-coverage-dies.html. 
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al” Medicaid benefits.249  Medicaid enrollees are statistically in fragile 
health, more likely to suffer from chronic conditions and disabling 
conditions, and less likely to receive high-level care due to provider 
reluctance to participate in a low-paying program.  It is disingenuous 
to call cutting benefits for budgetary savings a form of state experi-
mentation. 
States have argued that they merely provide health insurance to 
Medicaid enrollees, detaching themselves from responsibility for the 
actual care provided, especially when very low provider reimburse-
ment has lead to sub-standard care.  Some federal courts bought this 
argument, despite the language in the Medicaid Act indicating that 
the program is intended to provide care, not just payment services.  
PPACA declares that Medicaid provides medical care to its enrollees, 
rather than merely being a payor for their services.250  Theoretically, 
this should make budget cuts harder.  If states only act as insurers, 
then the leeway that the Medicaid Act provides them in making rea-
sonable payments would allow states to pay even lower rates than they 
already do with little accountability for the lack of providers willing to 
participate in the program.  But if Medicaid is designed to provide 
care, then the reasonable payment requirement means that states 
have to pay enough for medical care to actually be delivered to Medi-
caid enrollees.  This should mean that states will reimburse providers 
enough that they will willingly participate in Medicaid and not leave 
the program. 
In a post-recession economy, this is unlikely to be the case.  States 
are cutting payments and services because they cannot cut eligibility 
(a requirement of the ARRA and other additional funding that the 
states have received during the recession).  Interestingly, state flex-
ibility in provider payment is an issue that the Supreme Court will 
hear this term.251  As ominous as these financial decisions are, point-
ing fingers is not fruitful, as states often must maintain balanced 
budgets pursuant to provisions in state constitutions (a requirement 
 
249 See Sack, supra note 247.  Arizona was the only state to cut transplant benefits, and its sav-
ings for doing so seems small compared to the size of the state budget deficit:  $1.4 mil-
lion in savings for a $2.6 billion deficit.  Id. 
250 PPACA § 2304.  This responds to federal court decisions that had held that Medicaid was 
simply a payor.  See, e.g., Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 
1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the state of Oklahoma was only required to pay 
for statutorily outlined services, not to provide those services), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 813 
(2007). 
251 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 992 (Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 09-958).  The case was heard October 3, 2011, 
the first day of oral arguments for the October 2011 term. 
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that does not exist in the U.S. Constitution), and so states make hard 
choices in fulfilling their state constitutional responsibilities.  This re-
volves to the problem of political and financial lock-in.  But it seems 
that we have tested all of the cooperative federalism incarnations for 
Medicaid. 
In addition to facilitating equality, federalization would have great 
administrative benefits.  It would be more efficient for Medicaid pro-
viders and enrollees to deal with one executive branch rather than 
two, to deal with one set of payment policies, and to have reimburse-
ment based on policy considerations rather than state economic con-
ditions.252  The potential administrative and thus economic savings 
can be seen in the comparison of Medicare and Medicaid administra-
tive expenses provided above; Medicaid’s administrative costs are 
more than two and a half times Medicare’s.  Additionally, administra-
tive processes such as the waiver process, which take time and money, 
would cease. 
Federalization could also reduce total costs in a variety of ways, 
such as by eradicating state costs, reducing federal administrative 
costs, and ending state incentives to game the federal match in order 
to increase their federal funding.253  Section 1983 lawsuits against the 
states to enforce Medicaid entitlements would cease and also result in 
cost savings.254  Also, the two levels of fraud prosecution would no 
longer need to be maintained, though they already seem redundant 
when the federal government is so successful at ferreting out fraud in 
federal healthcare programs (and often takes over state investigations 
into fraud).255  As well, states’ costs for covering the uninsured for 
hospitals will be reduced by creating national equality in Medicaid, 
which PPACA will partially achieve in its enrollee expansion.256  These 
 
252 See Moon, supra note 239, at 330 (arguing that nationalization would simplify the pro-
gram resulting in saved costs and equalization of enrollee care). 
253 See Boyd, supra note 200, at 63 (“[S]tates have exploited a number of loopholes . . . to 
draw down additional federal funds while spending little, if any, of their own money.  
Thus, Medicaid is a source of revenue as well as an area of spending.”). 
254 PPACA instructs the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to investigate Section 
1983 causes of action against states for Medicaid failures.  PPACA § 10201(j).  See generally 
Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 14 (discussing the role of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a 
means to enforce federal statutory rights against the states within the Medicaid context). 
255 See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Care Fraud Preven-
tion and Enforcement Efforts Recover Record $4 Billion; New Affordable Care Act Tools 
Will Help Fight Fraud (Jan. 24, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2011pres/01/20110124a.html (announcing a record high recovery from individuals seek-
ing to defraud the health care system, resulting in money saved for taxpayers). 
256 See Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, supra note 104, at 12 (“The net impact of the 
Medicaid and CHIP provisions on State Medicaid costs is a reduction totaling $33 billion 
through fiscal year 2019.”). 
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are just a few examples of the practical and economic efficiencies na-
tionalization could achieve. 
It seems like the traditional federalism rationales no longer apply 
in the case of Medicaid (if they ever did).  Revisiting the Gregory v. 
Ashcroft four core values, we see that none of the values are a good fit, 
and the reasons for nationalizing are much stronger.  To wit:  First, 
“decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogeneous society” is not a strength in Medicaid, a 
healthcare program that is supposed to provide equal access to main-
stream medicine.  Mainstream medicine is largely nationalized, with 
variations existing for location, lack of resources, and lack of skill.  
But the states are very imprecise proxies for these issues (think of the 
difference between the metropolis of New York City and upstate, ru-
ral New York close to New Hampshire and Vermont—vastly different 
resources, populations, etc., but both within the same state). 
Second, the “opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic 
processes” is not particularly meaningful with a population that is no-
toriously politically invisible.  The poor who enroll in Medicaid are 
often de facto disenfranchised.  If they were politically powerful, they 
might have achieved the nationalization that senior citizens de-
manded when Medicare was created.  Instead, Medicaid has been on 
the “state program with federal oversight” path since 1965, and even 
earlier, because its participants are not able to influence political 
processes.257 
Third, and perhaps most important, “innovation and experimen-
tation in government” has resulted in wild inequality and little learn-
ing by example from state to state.  Though some states, such as New 
York, Massachusetts, and Maine, have managed to successfully ex-
pand their programs through waivers, most states now use waivers to 
cut costs by cutting benefits.  This phenomenon is especially true dur-
ing an economic downturn and very poorly timed under those cir-
cumstances.  The counter-cyclical spending that the federal govern-
ment can provide has been used to stabilize Medicaid for years, and 
the states have yet to find their own way to pay for Medicaid.  Natio-
nalization could at least raise the minimum care for Medicaid enrol-
lees.  If states want to provide a kind of wraparound additional bene-
fit, they could do so with their own funds.  Federal incentives to the 
 
257 Kate Pickert, What if All 50 States Get Ben Nelson’s Medicaid Deal?, TIME, Jan. 15, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1954158,00.html. (quoting Gail Wi-
lensky, a health care economist, regarding the Medicaid expansion). 
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states to provide more should be avoided; that just reintroduces the 
cooperative federalism morass. 
And fourth, instead of making “government more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry,” states seem 
to try to ensure that they provide fewer benefits than their neighbors 
in a race to the bottom.  Recall that the original Medicaid coverage 
was designed to equalize not only access to medical care but also the 
care provided to the poor.  Nationalizing Medicaid would facilitate 
“mobile citizenry” by ensuring the same medical benefits when a per-
son crosses state lines. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
PPACA began the task of federalizing Medicaid from both a philo-
sophical and an economic perspective.  Medicaid’s cooperative fede-
ralism structure was the product of history and path dependence, not 
a deliberate process by Congress.  Though Medicaid will cover all 
poor, not just the deserving poor, if the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is 
not overturned, this is only a piece of the puzzle.  The debate that ex-
ists regarding Medicaid and states’ rights draws the wrong conclusion.  
If the states are right that they are being coerced, the answer could be 
that the federal government should nationalize Medicaid rather than 
to continue to negotiate with the ungrateful states.  Further, this de-
bate is overly formalistic, as federalizing Medicaid would have nu-
merous benefits that help us to see past this amendment to the pro-
gram to the bigger picture benefits of breaking from this path. 
Medicaid enrollees receive differing access to medical care de-
pending on only their geography.  State experimentation with 
healthcare was rejected for the elderly in 1965, and yet states’ rights 
burden Medicaid operations to this day.  The only reason for the dis-
parity between the programs is the lack of political will that has been 
Medicaid’s albatross, despite polls that show a majority of Americans 
support a strong Medicaid program.258  Medicaid’s cooperative fede-
ralism structure undermines a program that is a necessary safety net; 
that safety net would be much stronger if it were federalized. 
 
258 See Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 (May 2011), 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8190-F.pdf. (demonstrating that reducing Medi-
caid coverage, as well as blocking grants for Medicaid, is unpopular with the public, even 
in the face of economic crisis). 
